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THE CAUSES OF WAR

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I WANT in this paper to discuss some of the more important and widely held theories of the nature and causes of war. Three views stand out, I think, fairly clearly in recent discussions. The first, which we may call the Socialist view, regards war as the outcome generally of economic factors and interprets modern wars as a necessary element in a *particular stage* of economic development, namely, imperialism. The second view, which is held mainly by Liberal and free-trade economists, denies that there is any necessary connexion between capitalism and war and asserts, on the contrary, that whatever may have been the case in the past, they are now incompatible. On this view war is an atavism, a survival of tendencies rooted in earlier social conditions and of dynastic conceptions of the State impregnated with the ideas of power and glory. Sir Norman Angell, who on the whole shares this view, lays particular stress on the anarchical condition of international political relations, the absence of adequate international institutions, and the persistence of false beliefs and unreal abstractions or illusions which makes rational control difficult, and induces men to approve policies which they would probably condemn if they realized vividly the consequences to which they are likely to lead. The third view is most clearly represented in psycho-analytic writings. According to this the fundamental, as distinguished from the precipitating, causes of war are to be found in the inherent aggressiveness

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of human nature and the failure of the repressive mechanisms whereby these aggressive tendencies are normally checked or held in balance. This being so, no changes in political, educational, or economic institutions will go to the root of the trouble, until efforts are made to eliminate the unconscious tensions and to dry up the sources of anxiety and hate.

The Socialist view is based primarily on a theory of imperialism rather than of war. In essentials it was stated very clearly by J. A. Hobson in his now classical work on *Imperialism* (1902). He distinguishes between colonialism and imperialism. The former consists in the migration of part of a nation to vacant or sparsely populated foreign lands, when the emigrants carry with them the full citizenship of their native land, or else establish institutions in conformity with those of the country of their origin and under her final control. Imperialism consists in the occupation of new territories by comparatively small numbers of white men who exercise political and economic sway over large masses of population who are regarded as incapable of exercising self-government either in politics or industry. He shows that imperialism thus understood owes its driving force to the pressure of capitalist industry for markets, primarily for investment but secondarily also for surplus products of home industry. "Over-production in the sense of an excessive manufacturing plant, and surplus capital which cannot find sound investment within the country, force Great Britain, Germany, Holland, France to place larger and larger portions of their economic resources outside the area of their present political domain and then stimulate a policy of political expansion so as to take in the new areas."¹ The root of the trouble Hobson finds in the mal-distribution of consuming power which prevents the absorption of commodities and capital within the country. The demand for new markets is not a "necessary" outcome of industrial

¹ *Imperialism*, p. 85.

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development, but of mal-distribution of consuming power, and would disappear under a more equitable diffusion of the gains of improved technique and organization.

The part played by "non-economic" factors is not denied. Patriotism, adventure, military enterprise, political ambition, and even philanthropy exercise an important influence on imperial expansion. All that is claimed is that finance manipulates the energies thus generated and gives them definite direction. The emergence of competing imperialisms has been the main cause of the vast armaments which are draining the resources of most European countries. The result of this imperialist policy is not only war but militarism, i.e. a constant preparedness for war on ever-increasing scale, the fostering of the belief that there is a real conflict of interests between different peoples and, consequently, the constant danger of war.

It is part of this theory that there is no inherent or necessary conflict between peoples or nations. Nationalism in the sense of the ideal to foster and develop whatever is specific to a particular ethnic group is no bar to internationalism. It is aggressive imperialism which has converted the nationalism of the earlier nineteenth century which was a cohesive, pacific, inclusive force into an exclusive, hostile force. The policy of protectionism, the scramble for markets, spheres of interest or of influence, the use of diplomatic machinery to secure concessions and leases, easily passing into a policy of forcible annexation, has been bad business for the nation. It has led and leads to vast expenditure on armaments, costly wars and the constant fear of war, and has arrested and still arrests international political and social reform. Its driving force is not national but sectional interest. By this is not meant that these interested groups deliberately seek wars and expansion for selfish motives which they hide under high-sounding moral phrases. "There is no enthusiasm in hypocrisy, and even bare-faced greed furnishes no adequate stimulus to a long policy." The process is psychologically

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more subtle. The men who inspire the policies of imperialism have first to deceive themselves if they are to deceive others. Nor do they cynically use the nobler drives of patriotism and humanitarianism for their own selfish interests. Rather do they attach themselves to any strong feeling likely to be of service, until self-sacrifice is made to cover domination and patriotism cloaks the lust of power.

The Neo-Marxists' position closely resembles that reached by Hobson, except that it does not appeal to the theory of under-consumption, and that, as is to be expected, it is fitted by them into the framework of a more general and far-reaching theory of the break-down of capitalism. Imperialism becomes a necessary and inevitable stage in the history of capitalism, that namely in which "the domination of monopoly and finance capital has taken shape, in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance, in which the division of the world by the international trusts has begun, and in which the partition of all the territory of the earth by the greatest capitalist countries has been completed."¹ Imperialism is moreover "parasitic or decaying capitalism." States come to live ever more on capital exports, and thus are driven along the path of military expansion. No doubt it is theoretically possible to imagine a kind of ultra-imperialism, or what Hobson called inter-imperialism, in which financiers would extend their organization across national barriers and substitute profitable co-operation for economic conflict. No doubt, too, even the workers might be induced to support this kind of imperialism by the bribe of high wages. But the development towards world monopoly is proceeding so unevenly and is accompanied by such an intensification of the antagonisms between rival imperialisms, that before the goal is reached, capitalism will have decayed as a result of its inner contradictions.²

This is not the place for a discussion of the whole Marxist

¹ Lenin, *Imperialism*, p. 81.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 113, and Preface to Bucharin, *Imperialism and World Economy*.

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theory of the evolution and downfall of capitalism. I must confine myself to the alleged connexion between imperialist capitalism and war, and to a brief review of the criticisms which have been adduced against the theory of such a connexion.

As to imperialism and war the empirical facts speak loud. The major causes of friction in the recent history of international relations were closely connected with imperialist rivalries. The Fashoda crisis which nearly led to a war between France and England in 1898 arose out of rivalry over the control of the Sudan. The "Moroccan crises" of 1905 and 1911, which nearly embroiled all Europe in war, arose directly out of the clash of the new trading and colonial interests of Germany with those of France and Great Britain, and it is generally agreed that the settlement left ill-feeling behind it which was to find expression in later quarrels. However complex the causes which led to the Boer War, no one doubts the important part played by financial interests. The occasion of the occupation of Egypt in 1882 was the danger to the foreign bondholders, though it is now generally agreed that there was the additional motive of protecting the Canal which it was believed necessitated the control of Egypt. The Russo-Japanese War arose out of the struggle for Korea and Manchuria, and the intrigues of timber merchants were certainly an integral part of the expansionist policy of the Russians. The recent seizure by Japan of a large section of China again is an instance of the influence of economic factors on militant imperialism.

This general theory of a necessary connexion between the policy of territorial expansion and the pressure of surplus capital for opportunities abroad has been attacked on various grounds which must be now briefly considered.

(a) Even in what is apparently the clearest case of such a connexion, namely, British Imperialism, Professor William L. Langer has argued that the export of capital had already reached high proportions by 1875 and that such export was

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not connected with the notion of political or territorial expansion. The boom in colonial annexations set in later (1884-1900). This, however, merely shows that the export of capital can occur without necessitating territorial expansion, and this no one is concerned to deny. Professor Langley himself points out that the break-down of the monopolistic position of England, through the embarkation of other countries on the course of empire, generated the conviction that political control was necessary for safeguarding markets and that therefore the whole imperialist movement was probably at bottom "as much economic as anything else."¹

(b) Of greater importance is the argument that some cases of modern imperialism do not fit in with the hypothesis of the rôle of investment-seeking capital as the source of expansionism. Tsarist Russia it has been argued, for example, had no surplus capital in any reasonable sense of the term, yet it was one of the greatest expansionist Powers in modern times. The causes here have to be sought in political ambition, dynastic megalomania, military lust for conquest. In so far as the capitalists were used in the process, they were rather a tool than an initiating cause.

As an argument against the general proposition that all expansion is due to surplus capital seeking opportunities for investment this case would be conclusive. But I doubt whether anyone would want to defend this proposition. It is clear that there was a great deal of military expansion long before the days of financial capital. Russia's earlier expansion clearly had nothing to do with surplus capital but was the work rather of restless frontiersmen seeking new lands for settlement, and in this sense belongs to colonialism rather than to imperialism, and of ambitious Tsars seeking warm-water outlets, windows to the West and so forth. During the nineteenth century, however, Russia was infected with an imperialism akin to that of Western Europeans, and in that

¹ *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, i, p. 95.

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later expansionism capitalist interests played their part even though the capital had to be borrowed from the French financiers.

Italian imperialism is another case which does not fit in very readily with a theory which lays exclusive stress on capital export as the determinant of expansion. For clearly Italy was poor in capital and it is doubtful how far the conquests paid. The total commerce with Libya in 1921 was only 201,630,575 lire, less than the annual deficit paid directly by Italy in the colonial budget.¹ It would seem that here the quest for national prestige and glory was the effective drive. Yet it must be remembered that though the conquest does not benefit the nation as a whole, the Banca di Roma and the Banca d'Italia may have made considerable profits and that there may have operated the illusion that such conquests pay due to the impression that Britain and others were enriched by them. There is a sort of circle in the influences thus exerted. The example of England no doubt incited other nations, while "the scramble for colonies among the continental nations has had the good effect at least of determining the English not to be left behind in the race for empire."² Empire gives prestige and prestige is sought in empire.

French Imperialism, it may further be noted, does not lend itself very readily to the Neo-Marxist explanations, since trade with the colonies was not very extensive and investments in foreign countries were of far greater importance than investments in the colonies. To meet this objection it has been argued³ that in this case there is still a connexion, though an indirect one, between colonial policy and the needs of financial capital. For a strong State is necessary to make foreign investments secure, and, with a stationary population, France is unable to build up an army of sufficient strength without the help of her colonies. This explanation is not likely to be found convincing by any but the faithful.

¹ Moon, Parker T., *Imperialism and World Politics* (New York, 1926), p. 223.

² Egerton, H. E., *A Short History of British Colonial Policy* (London, 1897), p. 6.

³ Cf. Sternberg, F., *Der Imperialismus* (Berlin, 1926).

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(c) A more radical attack has been made on the theory associating war in modern times with financial capital by Professor E. Staley,¹ and to this work great importance is attached by some Liberal economists. His method is to subject a number of historical instances, e.g. the Franco-Italian clash over Tunis, the Turko-Italian clash over Tripoli, the penetration of the Yalu by Russia before the Russo-Japanese War, the tension between England and Russia in Persia, the Japanese operations in Manchuria, to a detailed examination, and he argues that in all these instances financial penetration has been used by governments as a tool for "political" purposes rather than the other way about, and that frictions have arisen rather out of political causes than out of "purely economic" causes. On the other hand, the instances in which investors have directly brought major Powers into serious political friction are, he thinks, comparatively rare (Samoa and perhaps the Boer War). Immediate economic conflicts can and often are settled by compromise so long as political complications do not arise. Frictions arising out of investments become dangerous only when they have been pushed from the start for political reasons, and, on the other hand, investments do not receive strong political backing where they are not the tools of national policy or run counter to national policy.

While the argument is interesting, the method employed does not seem to me calculated to provide an adequate measure of the rôle of finance in imperialism and war. The fact that in many instances financial operations are encouraged by governments as means of penetration does not dispose of the theory of economic causation. We have still to ascertain the nature of the "political" factors which inspire governmental action, and these might very soon lead back to economic factors. The root of the matter is that the "economic" and the "political" cannot be separated in the way implied by Professor Staley's argument. Consider

¹ *War and the Private Investor.*

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the statement that the friction over the Baghdad railway was probably in the main political. This seems to be based on the fact that during the controversy there were several occasions when a compromise could have been attained by peaceful negotiation among the financiers involved. But how estimate the forces which led the diplomatists to intervene? From the British point of view the Baghdad railway was regarded as a menace to the Suez Canal and to India if the trunk line reached to the Persian Gulf. Can this fear be intelligibly described as purely "political"? The French feared the loss of their predominance in Syria. In the German attitude again it is quite impossible to separate the element of pure business from broader imperialistic designs. Political influences were used by them quite deliberately to further economic designs. In the Russian attitude economic interests were also at work, though here the aim eventually to dominate Constantinople and the Balkans also had deeper non-economic roots. It remains to be added that Professor Staley is only concerned with the view that there is a direct and immediate connexion between economic frictions and political conflicts, for which he thinks the inductive evidence affords no proof. But he disclaims any "attack upon the economic interpretation of history in its broader form. It may still be true that the larger political purposes in the service of which private investments become most dangerous—expansionism, the strategy of power, etc.—are themselves the product of forces best described as "economic."¹ It seems to me that often without an obvious and immediate economic motive the sense of antagonism and injustice may be rooted in economic policy, and while it may be true that national ambitions are not directly proportionate to the economic rivalries involved, yet the dangerous situations are those in which economic policies have become associated with the collective authority of national governments. Further, in interpreting this association, the question whether it is

¹ Cf. *War and the Private Investor*, p. xvi.

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initiated by governments or by business interests is not, it seems to me, of decisive importance.

This review of the objections that have been raised against the economic interpretation of imperialist expansion suggests, I think, that though this theory has not been fundamentally shaken, it is greatly in need of further clarification. There are evidently many different types of expansion, and it is difficult to determine with precision the part that is played in each by the complex motives of power and prestige, adventure and pugnacity, and the desire to secure preferential or exclusive markets. Yet it may well be the case that despite its complex and multiple origins, imperialism has tended, in proportion as the areas suitable for colonization have been occupied, to become a fight for external markets and spheres of economic influence, and that the support which is given to this movement by the powerful machinery of national States nourishes jealousies, suspicions, and hostilities generating militarism and eventually war.

The Liberal economists to whose views I now turn do not deny that an important source of friction between nations is to be found in the increasing intervention by governments in economic affairs. But this intermingling of the political and the economic factors, they would say, is not inherent in "capitalism as such," but is on the contrary a perversion of it.

Perhaps the most elaborate argument on these lines is that presented by Schumpeter in his *Zur Soziologie der Imperialisten*.¹ His chief contention is that there is no necessary connexion between capitalism and imperialism. On the contrary the true interests of capitalism lie in the direction of free competitive enterprise and unrestricted free trade. The mentality of the business man, he argues, somewhat after the manner of Herbert Spencer, is not that of the warrior. His energies are absorbed in the competitive struggle, and do not require the outlet which in pre-capitalist times could be found in war and conquest. We find in fact that it is just in the

¹ Cf. *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Bd. 46.

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country where modern capitalism first developed that there also grew up a strong movement for peace, and that countries which are least burdened with pre-capitalist mentality like the U.S.A. are the least imperialistically minded. Under free trade there would, he argues, be no real conflict of interest either between different nations or between corresponding classes of different nations. Since protectionism is not an essential characteristic of capitalism—witness England—it is clear, he maintains, that the drive towards aggressive expansion is not a necessary product of capitalism. Yet Schumpeter does not deny the essential thesis of the Socialists which emphasizes the part played in imperialism by monopolistic trusts and cartels. But he argues that these can only flourish under a system of tariffs. Protectionism, however, is not a necessary outcome of competitive capitalism, but a survival of former political conditions, and would disappear as soon as the majority began to understand their real economic interests. Imperialism is thus an atavism, a proof of the ancient truth that the living are ruled by the dead.

I do not find these arguments at all convincing. Schumpeter seems to think in terms of abstractions, capitalism as such, warrior mentality, industrial mentality, which are with difficulty applicable to the complex historical realities. The appeal to atavism and survivals is again a dangerous tool in sociology. There is clearly something very much wrong with a theory which can interpret the terrific imperial expansion of modern times as a mere carry-over of ancient habits. No doubt if people acted rationally in their economic pursuits they would see that free trade and peace were in the true interests of all. But to identify capitalism as such with a rational economic system is surely the height of abstraction. As a working concern capitalism is no freer from illusions than any other system. Historically, what has to be explained is the association of nationalism with protectionism and with the belief, no doubt mainly illusory, that the extension of territory in defenceless or semi-defenceless regions redounds to national

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glory and economic advantage. From the socialist angle what needs further analysis is the association of national selfishness and sectional or class selfishness within the nation to which already Cobden and Bright drew attention. Whether national sentiment is itself rooted in economic conditions is a problem which so far as I know has not been fully investigated as yet. But there can be no question that the linking of this sentiment with protectionism and expansionism, which is characteristic of the modern period, is due mainly to economic factors, and it is this which makes the efforts of the liberal economists to separate the political and the economic from one another wholly unreal. The present phase of economic nationalism affords a good illustration of this difficulty of separating the political and the economic. No doubt the tendency to autarchy is attributable partly to national pride, partly to the desire for self-sufficiency in time of war. You can call these motives political. But no one will deny that at least as important has been the greatly accelerated productivity due to improved technique which has affected both the advanced and the backward countries. The result has been a clamour for protection against foreign imports together with an increased pressure on governments for assistance in securing an expansion of the export trade, by means of embargoes and subsidies and by loans to needy nations often applied to armaments and other extravagances and not to purposes of genuine development.¹ The pressure comes from merchants and financiers and the bellicosity inherent in this procedure must therefore be ascribed to economic at least as much as to political motives.

Perhaps the divergence between the two types of theory I have been considering hitherto may be best brought out in the following way. The socialists insist that the aggressive elements in nationalism are essentially connected with the present economic system. This permits the selfish motives of classes or sections within each nation consciously or un-

¹ Cf. J. A. Hobson, *Democracy*, p. 125.

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consciously to utilize the energies of national sentiments in bolstering up protectionist policies within and expansionist policies without. They would therefore seek the remedy primarily in a reorganization of the economic system aiming at equality and the elimination of the profit motive. Under such a system, if widely adopted by States, international economic difficulties would not disappear so long as there remained great differences in the level of equipment and the standard of life among different peoples, but they would be likely to be handled with less bitterness and there would be a greater chance of genuine international co-operation, and of the establishment of efficient international organs of government. The liberal economists on the other hand regard the aggressive element in nationalism as in the main a survival of earlier dynastic militarism. The remedy they suggest is chiefly political. Exclusive state-sovereignty must be abandoned and an international federal authority established which would regulate relations between States. The removal of trade barriers and other restrictions would reduce friction and encourage friendly relations.

The "Political" solution is presented in the sharpest form in the writings of Sir Norman Angell. We know, he argues, from history that wherever a group of sovereign States has combined into a federation for mutual defence war has ceased. Differences of nationality as such do not lead to war: war arises out of nationality when it is associated with the claim to independent sovereignty, that is to the right to be judge in one's own cause and to defend it by preponderant power. Similarly, economic rivalries do not as such lead to war; indeed, the economic conflict would not arise but for political separateness. The essential thing is therefore to abolish the international anarchy by the establishment of a federal authority which would pool all power and so keep the peace. All that such an authority needs to do is to federalize defence. The Socialist argument he dismisses as based on conditions which no longer hold. So far from war

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being an essential element in capitalism, it is utterly ruinous to it. The capitalist system is indeed threatened with destruction if war is allowed to continue. The advantages to the investor of imperial relations over the non-imperial are certainly not sufficient to justify him in running the risk of war; capital so far from necessarily following the flag can and does disregard it. Again, "the problem of capitalism is now not the shortage of raw material which has to be 'politically' captured by wars that dislocate fatally the whole economic and financial system; but to adjust production and consumption: for which peace is indispensable." From the capitalist point of view no victory could under present conditions bring gains commensurate with its cost in monetary, financial, and economic dislocation.

Why then do not people realize these truths, and why is the world again drifting to war? Why, again, do arguments based on the need of the "have-not" States for raw materials and fresh markets still retain their force with large numbers of people?

How is it, moreover, that millions of men were ready in the last war, and are apparently again now ready, to fight for everything which is so palpably contrary to their economic interests? How, in short, are the delusions which Angell has exposed maintained?

The answer that Angell gives is mainly psychological in character. In the first place, there is sheer intellectual failure due to ignorance, personification of abstractions, and failure of imagination. In this way people quite readily accept or tacitly approve policies which, if properly analyzed, would be seen to be self-defeating and self-contradictory. Thus, during the Versailles conference a great many people certainly wanted a peace which would make further war impossible. But at the same time they clamoured for the annexation of new territory, the weakening of the enemies' trade, the retention by their own people of preponderant power, all policies conducive to war. Here it is plain that

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people did not see the relation between the policy they advocated and the end which they desired to attain or else they did not know how to choose between two mutually exclusive alternatives. Similarly, "the nationalist does not primarily want war; he wants independence and sovereignty for his nation and then domination of others as the only way to make it 'secure,' and fails to see that such a policy must produce war."¹

But secondly, as a result of this intellectual failure, the passions get a chance to express themselves in a manner often glaringly out of keeping with self-interest. "We say commonly of the Versailles treaty making that we could not see the plain facts because we were so angry. It would be truer to say that we were angry because we could not see the plainest fact, e.g. the Germany we desired to punish was not a 'person' but an aggregation of little children going to school, old women picking up sticks in the wood, tired artizans, Socialists, Junkers, Catholics, Protestants. . . ."² The relation between reason and emotion is in fact reciprocal: reason may be obscured by the emotions, but these themselves may arise because of misconceptions and especially the tendency to personify abstractions. From the practical point of view it is important to realize that a change in beliefs and valuations does alter the direction of the impulses and emotions. In this particular case the relevant emotions are those connected with certain ideas and beliefs which constitute political nationalism, the ideas of independence and sovereignty. These ideas tend to give full play to the impulses of self-assertion, domination, and coercion, which in turn obscure our powers of judgement and defeat, not only our sense of justice, but even our motives of self-interest. Conscious economic motives play in Angell's view only a minor part in the struggle between nations. Yet he believes that if only people realized certain economic elementary

¹ *Preface to Peace*, p. 234.

² *The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War*, p. 479.

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truths affecting the relations between peoples, the passions of patriotism could be checked or at least redirected and civilized.¹

There are several doubts which are raised by this line of argument despite its sincerity and persuasiveness. In the first place, does not Angell himself fall a victim to the delusion which he has done so much to expose, the delusion due to the personification of national entities? Wars probably do not pay the nation as a whole, but is it so clear that they do not pay certain sections of the nation? Similarly, protectionist policies do not benefit the nation as a whole, but that does not make these policies less attractive to the particular interests directly concerned. These sectional interests do not directly aim at war and they may even be convinced that the risks of war are now too great from a purely business point of view, but they use the power of the State to secure fresh markets, spheres of influence, etc., and in a competitive world they thus create the conditions which will result in war. It is even arguable that as the backward countries are themselves transformed into surplus-producing countries the competition for markets and fresh opportunities for investment will become keener and the political situation more dangerous.

Secondly, it is, I think, true that the motives directly appealed to in war propaganda are rarely those of direct economic gain, and that economic nationalism and imperialism do not owe their strength to calculated self-interest so much as to obscure notions of prestige and power. The strength of these motives is illustrated by the fact that the demand for equality of armaments with the allies had a greater influence on German opinion than the appeal to economic motives, sharpened though they were by grave distress. Yet I do not think that Sir Norman Angell realizes clearly enough how interwoven these motives have become under modern economic and political conditions. Economic development, including expansion abroad, has itself come to be

¹ Cf. *Preface to Peace*, p. 238.

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recognized as essential to a nation's prestige and power, while these in turn are utilized to further economic development. It has to be remembered further that peoples fight not only for expansion but generally in their own view for security, and this word is soon made to cover not only the desire to keep what one has but to make doubly sure by getting more. Nor does Sir Norman Angell pay sufficient attention to the fact that aggressive nationalism has frequently been used in the past as a tool for dulling internal discontent, not only political but economic. Whether or not we accept the view that Fascism is essentially a defence of capitalism against the feared reorganization of society by Socialists, we must agree that its flamboyant nationalism has not only political but also economic roots. On the whole, therefore, while agreeing with Sir Norman Angell in the stress he lays on the need for putting an end to political anarchy by the establishment of an international federal authority, it seems to me clear, especially in the light of recent experience, that such an authority will only be really successful if at the same time measures are taken to eliminate the deeper economic causes of war and militarism.

The psycho-analytic theory of the origins of war to which I now turn differs from both theories so far discussed in seeking to go behind social and economic structure to what are supposed to be the deeper underlying causes in the human mind. I will try to present this view in what appears to me its strongest form without attempting to follow in detail the various expositions that have been given of it by psycho-analytic writers. It is necessary to make clear at the outset that they are not concerned with the immediate or precipitating causes of particular wars which may vary infinitely. They are concerned rather with the predisposing factors, with the mental conditions, which make war possible and which shape its behaviour once it breaks out. They are struck with the readiness with which large masses of men respond to the call of war, the credulity and hysterical intoler-

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ance characteristic of war mentality. They point to the fact that even the experience of the disastrous consequences of the last war has not served to eradicate the tendencies to war, and that peoples are again drifting to war in a manner obviously against their self-interest. They point further to the enormous strength of the hate motive and the readiness with which people now respond to it everywhere. Their essential thesis is that this cannot be accounted for in terms of response to the immediate stimuli provided by the actual situation, but that underlying this mentality are deeper unconscious tensions, hidden frustrations, fears, and anxieties. They believe that there are in the human mind primitive tendencies to destruction and aggression. War, however, is not due to the direct resurgence of these primitive tendencies, but rather to a faulty balancing of the repressive and repressed elements in the mind. In times of stress these repressed tendencies are projected or displaced onto an enemy. We are afraid of ourselves and in our terror turn against others. We should not be so ready to be stimulated to anger and hate against the stranger, if we were not in a state of unconscious tension, nor would the mood of irrational credulity be produced so readily if there were not predisposing conditions to hate. There must be in us, so it is argued, a reservoir of unexploded aggression, the result of accumulated repression, anxiety, and frustration. Against this anxiety hate and hostility provide an inward protection. The roots of the anxiety ultimately are found in the faulty repression of the two fundamental groups of impulses of love and aggression, and the only radical way of dealing with the problem is therefore to devise methods for eliminating the influences making for sadism and masochism, especially in the infant environment.

This is obviously not the place for a detailed examination of the psycho-analytic theory of human instincts. By Freud the aggressive tendencies have been identified or linked with the hypothetical death instincts, the reality of which is, how-

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ever, disputed by many psycho-analysts. Further, psycho-analysts are not agreed as to the question whether the aggressive or destructive tendencies are to be regarded as primary or as secondary responses to interference or thwarting. Personally, I am not convinced that there is in man an inner need to destroy or hurt as there is a need to love or eat and drink. I am inclined to regard aggression as a form of self-assertion intensified under conditions of obstruction or the fear of obstruction, or loss of independence, and in other instances, of enhanced self-feeling and the enjoyment of mastery and power. In any event, as there is plenty of thwarting or baulking of primary dispositions, there is bound to be plenty of aggression, and, consequently, repression of aggression, and everything that psycho-analysts can suggest towards a more enlightened upbringing of children must be welcomed.

I thus recognize the value of the contribution that psycho-analysis has made and can make in the future towards the understanding of the causes of war. Nevertheless, several difficulties present themselves which I will briefly refer to.

In the first place, even if we grant that there are hidden or unconscious sources of aggression and hostility, the fact remains that some groups live in friendly relations with one another while others do not, and that in many instances, group hostility, so far from being spontaneous, has to be generated by persistent propaganda. Surely the differentiating factors cannot be regarded as merely secondary, but must form an integral part of any satisfactory explanation of the phenomena. From this point of view the distinction drawn between the precipitating and the more fundamental causes of war seems to be drawn in a superficial manner. No doubt the particular incidents which immediately precede a war may be relatively unimportant, but it is a serious error in method to exclude all the non-psychological factors from among the fundamental causes; and unless the relation between the mental factors and the social and economic

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background be studied in detail, the psycho-analytic theory must remain far too general to throw any light on the highly complex and variable relations between groups.

In the second place, it seems to me that in their eagerness to disclose the unconscious elements in war mentality, the psycho-analysts are apt to neglect factors lying nearer the surface which yet may have vital significance. Consider the stress they lay on the unconscious anxieties due to deep repression. This has led them to neglect the more obvious sources of frustration due to modern industrial conditions, the worry, monotony, lack of security, dominating the lives of large masses of working people. Are there not here enough sources of anxiety and fear to account in large measure for the readiness to seek an escape in war and for the ease with which people yield to the blandishments of orators offering a speedy change in the conditions of their lives? Consider again the apathy or indifference of many sections of the middle or upper classes and their unwillingness to make adequate preparation against war in peace time. Is not this political apathy an expression of the deep fear to undertake a radical examination of the economic and political structure which might be subversive of the existing order? and having failed to take thought in peace time, is it surprising that they fall a ready prey to panicky propaganda in times of stress?

Finally, the psycho-analytic attitude is clearly too individualistic and pays insufficient attention to the effect of institutions upon the actual behaviour of people. Consider such a simple case as the institution of forming queues. In its absence people jostle and fight, but the very same people are orderly and peaceful and amazingly patient as soon as the habit is formed. Changes in the economic and political institutions do bring about important changes in the actual behaviour of individuals without anything like the radical transformation of mind and character contemplated by the psycho-analysts. What is important in the psychology of war regarded from a sociological point of view is the associa-

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tion of aggression with other drives, such as economic motives and the desire for power. This combination is favoured by existing economic and political systems with their glorification of national prestige and the worship of wealth, a combination which might be broken up by a change in these institutions. No doubt these institutions again have their psychological side, but they are not to be understood in terms of psychology alone. From the practical point of view, I doubt, for example, whether any radical change in the educational system can be brought about without raising questions of economic and political reform. In short, the institutional and psychological approach are complementary and the possibilities of both must be explored if a rational solution of the problem of war is to be reached.

I have tried to bring out the extreme complexity of the causes leading to war and the difficulty of isolating any one set of factors which can be described as *the cause of wars*. I may perhaps bring together the main trends of my argument by setting out the principal factors which interwoven with one another appear to me to be responsible for modern wars. It is useful to distinguish between the fundamental predisposing conditions and the immediate or inciting conditions and I will mention chiefly the former.

First there are imperialist rivalries due to differences in economic and political power between different nations and particularly to the existence of relatively undeveloped parts of the world offering opportunities for expansion and exploitation. This tendency to expansion is encouraged by the capitalist form of economic organization which necessitates the search for new markets and thus generates animosities which tend to express themselves in political conflicts. Whether these imperialistic rivalries would disappear under a Socialist organization may be doubted. It must be remembered that under a Socialist regime the linking up of the political with the economic is carried to its extreme point, since all foreign trade is politically controlled. In the

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case of those countries which have or believe themselves to have an insufficient supply of raw materials in their own domain or which have developed their production beyond what is necessary for internal consumption, occasions of friction might well arise quite as difficult to resolve as those which exist between capitalist States. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the profit motive once eliminated there might be a greater chance than there is now of an amicable solution of the problems of raw materials, immigration, and export.

Secondly, I should put the fear that nations have of each other due to a large extent to the resentment left behind by former wars and the treaties of peace which concluded them.

Thirdly, the existence of armaments which heighten this fear and keep it alive.

Fourthly, and as a consequence in part of the foregoing, the unwillingness of nations to give up their right of self-defence and the resulting absence of any effective international organization for dealing with disturbances of equilibrium.

Fifthly, the psychological factors making for anxiety, fear, and hate, partly the result of economic and political factors, and partly having their roots deeper in the forces discussed by the psycho-analysts.

Sixthly, another factor is to be found in the nature of public opinion in complex societies. It is sometimes held that there is now a general will for peace, but a general will is just what there is not. Here, as in so many other phases of public life, what is will is not general and what is general is not will. The truth is that the mass of people do not feel either individually responsible or competent to deal with the complex issues that arise, and realizing that they cannot control policy they leave events to take their course. Hence it frequently happens that statesmen having blundered into catastrophe console themselves with the reflection that owing to public opinion they could not have acted otherwise, while it is quite likely that had they given a lead public opinion might well have welcomed a generous and peaceful policy.

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Thus as Lowes Dickinson has said: "Governments do not lead and nations do not follow. There is a general slithering into the pit, into which, nevertheless, everybody would say they do not wish to fall."¹

The discussion of the origins of war and the conditions of peace abounds in overdrawn antitheses. Thus the political is contrasted with and even separated from the economic and, what is even stranger, both are contrasted with the psychological. In fact the causation is extremely complex and the attempt to control the factors involved frequently results in vicious circles. You cannot get a reorganization of the economic life within a country without raising international problems, and international troubles cannot be got rid of without raising problems of internal organization. You will never get peace until you get socialism, say some. To which the reply is made: You will never get socialism until you get peace. You must first re-educate mankind, it is maintained, and the political and economic reconstruction will follow. You must first revolutionize society and human nature will be transformed in consequence, say others in return. The essence of the matter is the recognition that the circles *are* vicious and that to break them a simultaneous and concerted attack at different points is necessary.

¹ *War*, p. 111.

THE CORRELATION BETWEEN FERTILITY AND INTELLIGENCE WITHIN SOCIAL CLASSES

By PEARL MOSHINSKY, B.Sc.(ECON.), PH.D.

THE PROBLEM

A CHARACTERISTIC feature of the present phase of our industrial civilization is the existence of differential fertility rates at various social levels. Though recent work has shown this to be in all probability a temporary phenomenon, it is still true that the poorer sections of the community produce larger families than those who are economically more favoured. It is not surprising therefore that inquiries into the distribution of intelligence among the population have also considered the problem of the relation between intelligence of children and fertility of parents. Among recent publications, the most significant correlations between intelligence and fecundity were noted by Chapman and Wiggins (1), ($r = - .33$), Theodore Lentz (2), ($r = - .30$), and Willoughby (3), ($r = - .30$). The fact, however, that these investigations have been carried out on heterogeneous social groups limits the validity of the conclusions which have been drawn from them. For example, Chapman and Wiggins, in a sample of 632 individuals, found, in addition to the correlation ratio of $- .33$ for fertility and intelligence, a connexion between social status and family size ($r = - .27$) and also between social status and I.Q. ($r = .32$). They do not appear to have recognized that the fertility-intelligence correlation value might well be no more than a function of the other two values. In the absence of a controlled environment, therefore, the existence of such a correlation must be interpreted with caution. It is obvious that, given, on the one hand, differential performance in

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intelligence tests in favour of the wealthier social classes (this is almost invariably found on the tests in common use), and, on the other hand, differential fertility rates in favour of the poorer section of the community, a negative correlation between fertility and intelligence *must* be recorded when a socially heterogeneous group is examined. Such a correlation throws no real light on the origin of the connexion, and too frequently a hasty interpretation of hereditary causality is produced without any further supporting evidence.

Sutherland (4) foresaw this difficulty, and limited his investigation to 3,000 individuals of one social and economic group, namely miners. He found reduced values in the two sets of individuals examined ($r = - .129$ and $- .126$), and concluded that a negative correlation between I.Q. and size of family exists, but to a less marked degree when occupation and social status are more homogeneous. Equally significant is the fact that Sutherland and Thomson (5) found that a group of 386 grammar-school children yielded the low value of $- .058$, and a group of 395 boys and girls from Moray House School, Edinburgh, a value of $r = - .075$. Similarly, the group tested by Theodore Lentz, Junior (2), ($r = - .30$), when subdivided into geographical areas (each one of which was presumably socially and occupationally somewhat more homogeneous than the group as a whole), *in each case* produced a much-reduced correlation coefficient.

A more recent study was undertaken in this country by Dr. Fraser Roberts and his collaborators (6). They tested over 3,000 children in the city of Bath, drawn from all types of schools, and limited to a restricted age-group. It was found that the correlation value for the whole group of $- .224$ was considerably reduced in each case when the group was split up into different types of schools. In three out of four of these sub-groups, the correlation coefficient was below $- 0.1$.

In the present inquiry, it was decided to investigate the connexion between fertility and intelligence in groups of people representing fairly restricted social and socio-economic

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categories, and to compare the connexion between these two factors found within each group.

NATURE OF THE SAMPLE

This study was made possible as a result of a wider inquiry into the ability and educational opportunities of schoolchildren, undertaken by Professor J. L. Gray and the present author. Its results have been published in previous copies of this journal (7 and 8). Since details of the samples used and methods of employing the test have already been given in full, a short summary must suffice here.

Altogether 10,000 schoolchildren between the ages of 9 years and 12 years 6 months were given the Otis Group Advanced Intelligence Test, Form A, and Intelligence Quotients and Indices of Brightness were recorded for every individual. All types of schools attended by children in this age-group were included, in order to obtain comprehensive samples of each social category. The numbers tested were as follows:

TABLE I
NUMBERS OF PUPILS TESTED IN EACH TYPE OF SCHOOL

<i>Free Pupils:</i>	
Elementary, aged 9·0-11·0	2,261
Elementary, aged 11·1-12·6	1,457
Central	2,026
Secondary Free Pupils	1,038
<i>All Free Pupils</i>	<u>6,782</u>
<i>Fee-paying Pupils:</i>	
Private	728
Preparatory	988
Secondary Fee-payers	1,661
<i>All Fee-payers</i>	<u>3,377</u>
<i>All Pupils</i>	<u>10,159</u>

NOTE ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH SCHOOL SYSTEM

Elementary schoolchildren, who do not pay fees, are subdivided at the age of 11 plus, as a result of a scholarship examination. Up to the age of 11, therefore, we have a random sample (for intelligence). After 11, those children giving the best examination performance become free pupils in secondary schools, subject to a means test qualification. Another group, not so highly selected, but well above average intelligence, is drafted to central schools, and those remaining in elementary schools thus form a group selected for low I.Q.

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In this investigation, we have restricted the term "secondary" school to those wholly maintained by or in receipt of financial grants from the State. The "preparatory" group is composed of schools belonging to the Headmasters' Conference, which form a fairly homogeneous type. Public schools are not considered in our group, since the age of entry is above the maximum age to which we confined ourselves (12 years 6 months).

In order to obtain figures for the separate groups of "Free" pupils, and "Fee-payers," a statistical device of weighting was employed, designed to make the sample a representative one of the community as a whole. The method is fully explained in the publications already referred to.

In addition to subdivision into types of school, a cross-division is employed of socio-economic status, based on the occupation of the father.

For the present purpose, it was necessary to collect additional information from each child concerning its sibship and birth-order, which was in each case obtained by direct questioning and examination. Owing to the size of the group, it was not found possible to collect the information through individual questioning of the parents, as this would have necessitated separate visits to each child's home. As an alternative, a set of standardized questions was drawn up, designed to check the child's knowledge and the completeness of his replies. All those children who belonged to families in which either of the parents had married a second time, and who therefore belonged to abnormal sibships, were automatically eliminated, and care was also taken to exclude every known case of families with illegitimate children. Of the remaining number, less than 2 per cent. were rejected because of insufficient or ambiguous replies.

The child was required to recollect the total number of children born to his mother, including any who had died and any who were living outside the family home, either with relatives or because they were adults with a home of their own. In addition, he was required to record his birth-order, which was checked by individual questioning. Where there were sibs in the school, the answers of one were verified by the other. For younger or less intelligent children, these requirements were not easily met, and considerable persistence had to be exercised in the collection of the material. Since the examiners were aware of the various sources of error, and

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special efforts were made to overcome them, it is believed that on the whole the reliability of this section is satisfactory.

FAMILIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE DATA

Table II shows the percentage distribution of sibships of different sizes in each type of school examined.

TABLE II
FAMILY SIZE DISTRIBUTION IN SCHOOL POPULATIONS

Family Size.	1. Free Pupils.					2. Fee-paying Pupils.				
	Elementary, 9-10-11-12. Per cent.	Elementary, 11-12-12-6. Per cent.	Central. Per cent.	Second- ary Free. Per cent.	All Free (weigh- ted). Per cent.	Second- ary Fee- payers. Per cent.	Private. Per cent.	Prepara- tory. Per cent.	All Fee- payers (wtd.). Per cent.	
1	7.7	7.5	13.7	17.2	8.0	25.0	27.3	17.5	22.6	
2	18.1	15.8	28.2	28.6	18.2	38.6	32.8	38.0	36.6	
3	18.1	17.5	20.5	24.8	18.2	21.0	21.8	26.1	23.3	
4	15.2	15.2	14.0	12.5	15.1	8.1	11.4	11.1	10.4	
5 and over	41.1	43.9	23.7	16.8	40.5	7.3	6.6	7.3	7.1	
Total Number	2,155	1,392	1,918	1,009	6,474	1,621	714	962	3,297	

Some caution is necessary in interpreting these figures. In a random sample of children of a given age-range, large families may be represented twice, or in rare cases, even three times, since the chance of selecting siblings is greater in large than in small families, both because there are more individuals in the sibship, and also because the births are less widely spaced. Also, since the data actually contain more than 300 pairs of elementary school sibs, it exaggerates the numerical preponderance of large families amongst free pupils. The figures do not illustrate the distribution of the *families*, but rather of the children within the families, and therefore they cannot be used to demonstrate the relative frequency of families of different sizes in the general population.

The figures, therefore, have only a limited significance. But while comparisons between schools with a high and schools with a low proportion of large families cannot be

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exact, certain broad differences are unmistakably indicated. It is clear that the proportion of small families is much greater amongst the relatively prosperous than amongst the relatively poor. Comparing school populations that are not recruited on the basis of ability (i.e. elementary 9·0-11·0 and all fee-payers), we see from Table II that 26 per cent. of elementary schoolchildren aged 9·0-11·0 belong to families of one or two, compared with 63·6 per cent. of fee-payers in secondary schools, 60·1 per cent. of children in private schools, and 55·5 per cent. of children in preparatory schools. It is beyond question, also, that the proportion of children belonging to families of five or more is very much greater in elementary schools than amongst fee-paying pupils, although, as previously suggested, the extent of these differences is probably exaggerated by the figures. In the elementary schools, about six times as many children belong to families of five and over as to single-member families, while among fee-payers, children in single-member families number three times those in families of five or more. The largest proportion of small families is to be found among fee-payers in secondary schools, and not among the most prosperous class of all, namely, the preparatory-school population.

The family history of children who gain scholarships to secondary schools appears to differ widely from that of the average elementary schoolchild. Roughly 46 per cent. of the former come from families of one or two, another 25 per cent. from three-member sibships, and only 17 per cent. from those of five or more. The figures for the random elementary school population are 26 per cent., 18 per cent., and 41 per cent. respectively. Elementary schoolchildren from smaller families would therefore seem to benefit more from the scholarship system (and also from central-school places) than those from larger families. At first sight, this gives the appearance of a negative correlation between fertility and intelligence in the free-school population. But the point is not so easily determined, and is considered in greater detail in a later section.

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(a) *Analysed for Different Types of School*

The mean intelligence rating for each family size for different types of school is set out in Table III (using Index of Brightness), and Table IV (using the more familiar I.Q.).

For the elementary groups and the central-school pupils, the means have been calculated for family sizes up to ten and over. The numbers in the remaining school populations did not permit the analysis of sibships of five and over to be made separately, and they are therefore grouped together.

A striking difference in trend will at once be noticed when comparing figures for the category of All Free Pupils and that of All Fee-payers. The first group shows a steady decline in I.B. (and also in I.Q.) with increasing family size. In the second, while there is a slight tendency for families of one and two to be superior in intelligence, there is little divergence between sibships of three, four, and five-and-over. In the group of Free Pupils, the lower limit of I.B. for families with only one child is 108.2. The upper limit for families of five-and-over is 91.7, giving a difference of 16.5 points in I.B. For the fee-paying group, the corresponding figures are 120.3 and 120.0, the difference being only 0.3. It may be argued that the numerical composition of the group of families of five-and-over varies too greatly in the two categories to make the figures comparable. The means for families of five to ten-and-over in the elementary 9.0-11.0 group suggest that this argument has some validity. An unduly high proportion of the later family sizes tends to depress the mean for the group of five-and-over as a whole. This objection may be overcome by comparing the intelligence-test attainment of families of one and families of four. The difference in the free group is 7.6 points compared with 1.7 for fee-payers, the ratio of the difference being of the significant order of 4.5 : 1. The Intelligence Quotient figures give similar results.

Our conclusions therefore lend support to the suggestion

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TABLE III
MEAN FAMILY SIZE I.B. IN DIFFERENT SCHOOL POPULATIONS

Family Size.	Free Pupils.				Fee-paying Pupils.			
	Elementary, 9 to 11-y.o.	Elementary, 11-1-12-6.	Central.	Secondary Free.	All Free (weighted).	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private and Preparatory.	All Fee-payers (weighted).
1	107.6 ± 2.20	99.4 ± 2.90	129.2 ± 1.21	150.8 ± 1.42	108.8 ± 1.62	119.3 ± 1.29	122.6 ± 1.29	121.6 ± 1.25
2	105.4 ± 1.45	98.7 ± 1.83	126.9 ± 0.72	148.7 ± 1.10	106.6 ± 1.05	120.9 ± 1.05	119.3 ± 1.27	119.8 ± 0.94
3	98.7 ± 1.32	95.4 ± 1.81	127.0 ± 0.89	145.2 ± 1.16	100.4 ± 0.99	117.3 ± 1.51	117.6 ± 1.47	117.5 ± 1.12
4	97.6 ± 1.53	93.7 ± 1.98	127.4 ± 1.16	147.9 ± 1.55	98.5 ± 1.12	112.1 ± 2.21	118.6 ± 2.13	117.1 ± 1.63
5 and over	91.3 ± 0.89	85.7 ± 1.16	145.5 ± 0.85	144.5 ± 1.37	91.0 ± 0.66	116.7 ± 2.64	118.3 ± 3.02	117.7 ± 2.26
6	95.3 ± 1.78	88.0 ± 2.25	126.1 ± 1.41					
7	89.9 ± 1.90	88.5 ± 2.41	123.5 ± 1.80					
8	88.6 ± 1.85	81.1 ± 2.76	125.0 ± 2.16					
9	92.5 ± 2.63	87.6 ± 2.96	126.5 ± 3.03					
10 and over	88.3 ± 2.80	81.7 ± 3.86	117.7 ± 2.82					
	89.8 ± 2.71	86.8 ± 1.16	123.2 ± 2.54					

TABLE IV
MEAN FAMILY SIZE I.Q. IN DIFFERENT SCHOOL POPULATIONS

Family Size.	Free Pupils.				Fee-paying Pupils.			
	Elementary, 9 to 11-y.o.	Elementary, 11-1-12-6.	Central.	Secondary Free.	All Free (weighted).	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private and Preparatory.	All Fee-payers (weighted).
1	122.1 ± 1.89	115.4 ± 2.22	138.3 ± 0.80	149.8 ± 0.75	122.7 ± 1.33	131.2 ± 1.00	131.7 ± 1.35	131.5 ± 0.99
2	118.9 ± 1.24	116.7 ± 1.45	137.8 ± 0.56	149.3 ± 0.59	132.0 ± 0.87	131.1 ± 0.65	131.3 ± 0.72	131.0 ± 0.87
3	113.6 ± 1.12	113.6 ± 1.43	138.1 ± 0.64	147.8 ± 0.64	115.7 ± 0.82	128.9 ± 1.18	130.4 ± 1.14	130.0 ± 0.87
4	112.6 ± 1.21	112.4 ± 1.50	136.8 ± 0.81	149.7 ± 0.64	114.2 ± 0.87	125.8 ± 1.80	129.9 ± 1.60	129.0 ± 1.24
5 and over	108.6 ± 0.71	106.7 ± 0.84	138.1 ± 0.32	147.5 ± 0.80	109.2 ± 0.50	129.7 ± 1.99	131.1 ± 2.14	130.6 ± 1.61
6	112.4 ± 1.47	108.4 ± 1.68	136.6 ± 1.03					
7	108.1 ± 1.55	108.4 ± 1.81	135.9 ± 1.38					
8	106.3 ± 1.45	102.9 ± 1.97	136.7 ± 1.66					
9	108.8 ± 2.18	108.0 ± 2.20	136.8 ± 2.36					
10 and over	105.0 ± 2.03	103.7 ± 2.74	129.7 ± 2.24					
	107.1 ± 2.09	106.5 ± 2.45	135.2 ± 1.84					

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made by Fraser Roberts, Norman and Griffiths (6), to the effect that within the group of individuals whose children attend public and private school (i.e. the group corresponding to our fee-payers), differential fertility in regard to intelligence has practically ceased to operate. In other words, it would appear that whatever direct or indirect connexion exists between the size of family and the intelligence of the offspring, the factors causing it are subject to considerable modification with such variations in the environment as are to be found in schools of different social categories.

This social difference in the connexion between fertility and intelligence is brought out independently by applying the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient for family size and I.B. to the unselected school groups (i.e. elementary 9·0-11·0, secondary fee-payers and private and preparatory school populations). The group of elementary school-children aged 11·1-12·6 are excluded since, as we have already seen, the children of higher intelligence are drawn off at the age of eleven, leaving a group selected for low intelligence. For the same reason, the two categories of central and secondary free pupils, both selected for high intelligence, are also omitted. Table V gives the ratios and numbers for each of the four remaining groups.

TABLE V
FAMILY SIZE AND I.B. CORRELATION FOR UNSELECTED SCHOOL GROUPS

School.	Correlation Coefficient.	N.
Elementary, 9·0-11·0 . . .	—·230 ± 0·25	1,386
Secondary Fee-payers . . .	—·065 ± 0·25	1,622
Private	—·088 ± 0·37	716
Preparatory	—·020 ± 0·32	963

The most significant value is found in the unselected elementary-school group, namely, $—\cdot230 \pm 0\cdot25$. The values for the three sets of fee-payers can hardly be regarded as significant, since in no case are they more than three times

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the probable error. The smallest value of all is that for the most prosperous group of children, i.e. those in preparatory schools.

These figures would appear to confirm the work of those investigators who have found that the connexion between fertility and intelligence is not independent of the social environment. Table V suggests that the more favourable the environment, the less obvious is the connexion between the intelligence of the children and the sibship to which they belong.

In order to discover whether the same indications were present when the children were separated into groups based on the occupation and socio-economic status of the parents (instead of the type of school attended by the children), a further analysis was made of the same sample on these lines.

(b) Family Size and Intelligence in Socio-Economic Groups

As part of the investigation into Ability and Opportunity, previously mentioned, each child was individually examined about the occupation of his father or guardian. If the father was dead, or otherwise not supporting the family, the source of the family income was ascertained. Preliminary tests enabled a series of questions to be framed designed to check the accuracy of replies. The children were found to have a distinct tendency to exaggerate the status of their parent's employment, a phenomenon also noticed by the Census authorities. Since, however, the distribution of occupational orders in the data compares satisfactorily with that of the Census Occupational Tables, there is little probability of any serious over-estimation of employment status.

For the purpose of the present analysis, only the wider socio-economic groupings (called "Social Categories" in the previous investigation) have been adopted. A more refined subdivision would have given numbers too small to be statistically reliable. The basis of differentiating the various

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categories was a combination of vocation, average income, and "social status" (here meaning the prestige now ascribed to various types of economic personnel by the majority of people in this country). Each category is relatively homogeneous in social prestige, and the order in which they are arranged is not important.

A table of the socio-economic distribution of the data, together with a full description of the classification, has been given in a previous publication (8). We have thought it desirable, however, to give here a short summary of each category employed.

A. Employing and Directive Classes

This includes all those whose incomes are obtained primarily from ownership of property, together with those included in the American term "Business Executives." This group was separated into three subdivisions.

- (i) Larger Business Owners and Higher Executives.
- (ii) Smaller Business Owners.
- (iii) Shopkeepers.

B. Professional Occupations

The distinction made by Carr-Saunders and Jones (10) between those professions demanding a higher and those demanding a lower level of skilled and educational equipment is followed here. B contains only the former.

C. Minor Professional and other Highly-skilled Occupations

This group includes occupations often described as professions, but recognized to require a lower degree of attainment than the more traditional professions of category B.

D. Clerical and Commercial Employees

i.e. those individuals usually known as "black-coated" workers.

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E. Manual Workers

All individuals in this section are wage-earners participating directly in the manipulative, tool, or machine processes of industry or engaged in personal service. They are subdivided into Skilled and Unskilled mainly on the basis of the Census of Population occupational tables.

The next eight tables (VI-XIII) analyse in detail the

TABLE VI
MEAN FAMILY SIZE I.B. AND I.Q. IN OCCUPATIONAL GROUP OF DIRECTORS AND
BUSINESS MEN
(Fee-paying Pupils Only)

Family Size	I.B.			I.Q.		
	Secondary Fee-payers	Private and Preparatory.	All Fee-payers (weighted).	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private and Preparatory.	All Fee-payers (weighted).
1	122.0 ± 3.57 (50)	123.2 ± 3.25 (87)	123.0 ± 2.51 (137)	133.5 ± 2.87	133.3 ± 2.54	133.4 ± 1.98
2	120.7 ± 2.77 (88)	118.9 ± 2.39 (72)	119.2 ± 1.87 (260)	131.0 ± 2.13	130.5 ± 1.93	130.6 ± 1.50
3	118.2 ± 3.65 (56)	115.0 ± 2.81 (115)	115.5 ± 2.25 (171)	129.9 ± 2.85	129.9 ± 2.22	129.9 ± 1.77
4	110.9 ± 5.95 (16)	117.9 ± 3.48 (73)	117.3 ± 3.02 (89)	124.9 ± 5.11	129.0 ± 2.68	128.7 ± 2.42
5 and over	118.9 ± 6.48 (14)	118.6 ± 5.55 (35)	118.6 ± 4.34 (49)	129.9 ± 4.80	129.7 ± 3.94	129.7 ± 3.11

Note.—The figures underneath the I.B. values refer to the number of children in each group.

TABLE VII
MEAN FAMILY SIZE I.B. AND I.Q. IN PROFESSIONAL GROUP
(Fee-paying Pupils only)

Family Size.	I.B.			I.Q.		
	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private and Preparatory.	All Fee-payers (weighted).	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private and Preparatory.	All Fee-payers (weighted).
1	132.8 ± 3.13 (52)	126.4 ± 3.78 (79)	127.8 ± 2.81 (131)	140.2 ± 2.24	133.9 ± 2.75	135.3 ± 2.04
2	126.1 ± 2.74 (84)	122.7 ± 2.70 (123)	123.4 ± 2.06 (207)	136.5 ± 2.21	132.8 ± 1.99	133.6 ± 1.54
3	128.5 ± 3.75 (57)	126.9 ± 2.96 (91)	127.3 ± 2.36 (148)	138.2 ± 2.78	136.5 ± 2.24	136.8 ± 1.78
4	107.2 ± 3.62 (14)	124.5 ± 4.17 (53)	122.7 ± 3.11 (67)	120.1 ± 3.04	134.9 ± 3.15	133.3 ± 2.39
5 and over	131.3 ± 5.57 (24)	121.1 ± 5.57 (35)	123.4 ± 4.24 (59)	139.7 ± 3.93	132.3 ± 4.37	133.9 ± 2.38

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TABLE VIII

MEAN FAMILY SIZE I.B. AND I.Q. IN MINOR PROFESSIONAL AND OTHER HIGHLY-SKILLED OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
(Fee-paying Pupils Only)

Family Size.	I.B.			I.Q.		
	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private and Preparatory.	All Fee-payers (weighted).	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private and Preparatory.	All Fee-payers (weighted).
1	118.9±3.39 (65)	129.1±4.51 (54)	125.7±3.32 (119)	130.4±2.63	136.5±3.29	134.4±2.43
2	122.4±2.72 (86)	116.4±3.03 (121)	117.8±2.27 (207)	133.7±2.23	130.8±2.27	131.5±1.72
3	116.7±3.48 (60)	117.0±3.13 (88)	116.9±2.43 (148)	128.2±2.58	130.1±2.54	129.7±1.94
4	114.0±5.04 (25)	114.7±4.43 (33)	114.5±3.45 (58)	126.3±3.82	126.4±3.58	126.4±2.76
5 and over	107.1±5.04 (19)	127.7±6.56 (15)	120.5±4.83 (34)	122.4±4.60	143.2±2.62	135.5±2.29

TABLE IX

MEAN FAMILY SIZE I.B. AND I.Q. IN CLERICAL AND COMMERCIAL OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
(Fee-paying Pupils only)

Family Size.	I.B.			I.Q.		
	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private and Preparatory.	All Fee-payers (weighted).	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private and Preparatory.	All Fee-payers (weighted).
1	115.1±2.45 (106)	120.0±4.12 (53)	117.8±2.98 (159)	127.7±1.97	131.2±3.04	129.6±2.21
2	122.1±2.05 (152)	122.6±4.34 (61)	122.4±3.10 (213)	133.9±1.61	134.8±3.31	134.4±2.37
3	119.2±2.90 (61)	116.0±4.03 (36)	117.3±2.95 (97)	131.8±2.52	128.6±3.49	129.9±2.56
4	118.6±5.63 (30)	123.7±6.83 (11)	120.9±5.07 (41)	130.5±4.21	133.0±5.33	131.6±3.94
5 and over	120.9±7.07 (12)	121.4±13.30 (8)	121.2±9.55 (20)	133.0±5.32	125.6±7.78	128.5±5.68

family-size and intelligence differences within the above homogeneous social groups. Tables VI-IX deal with fee-payers only. Figures are given separately for the group of secondary fee-payers, for the private and preparatory school-children combined (the separate groups being too small for effective analysis), and for the group of All Fee-payers, weighted to reproduce the correct proportion of the constituent groups within the population.

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Table VI, which refers to the children of large business owners, seems to show at first a slight trend of declining intelligence with increasing family size. But in view of the size of the probable error, the apparent superiority of only children is not really significant. In the professional group (Table VII), similarly, no real gradation can be traced, but among the children of those in minor professional and other highly-skilled occupations (Table VIII), some trend of declining intelligence down to sibships of four is unmistakable. For this group, however, the I.B. of families of five-and-over is unexpectedly high. In fact, it is not significantly lower than that for only children, and it thus contradicts the conclusion which might be drawn from the rest of the table. Table IX, which includes children of clerical and commercial employees, again shows no connexion between intelligence and family size.

Table X deals with free pupils only, the children of those in both professional and commercial occupations being combined, since the numbers of the former were too small for separate analysis.

TABLE X

MEAN FAMILY SIZE I.B. AND I.Q. IN PROFESSIONAL AND COMMERCIAL GROUPS (COMBINED)
(Free Pupils only)

Family Size.	I.B.		I.Q.	
	Elementary, 9·0-11·0.	All Free Pupils (weighted).	Elementary, 9·0-11·0.	All Free Pupils (weighted).
1	115·1 \pm 4·82 (24)	115·7 \pm 4·05 (181)	126·3 \pm 4·43	127·1 \pm 3·36
2	117·7 \pm 4·64 (58)	118·8 \pm 3·25 (305)	132·3 \pm 3·74	132·4 \pm 2·57
3	111·7 \pm 4·55 (35)	112·6 \pm 4·14 (188)	125·4 \pm 3·78	126·2 \pm 3·45
4	113·4 \pm 6·16 (28)	111·1 \pm 5·49 (131)	126·1 \pm 4·57	125·9 \pm 3·97
5 and over	102·4 \pm 4·54 (52)	100·5 \pm 3·36 (181)	118·5 \pm 3·48	117·2 \pm 2·42

If we exclude the score for only children, a fall in intelligence is noticeable from families of two to families of five-and-over. The score for the latter, it will be seen, drops to an appreciable

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extent. Here too, however, in view of the low value for families of one, and the large probable errors in each category, any trends that are demonstrated must be accepted with caution.

Tables XI and XII analyse the data for both free pupils and fee-payers.

TABLE XI
MEAN FAMILY SIZE I.B. AND I.Q. IN OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS OF SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS
AND SHOPKEEPERS
(Free Pupils and Fee-payers)

Family Size.	I.B.					All Fee-payers (weighted).
	Elementary, 9·0-11·0.	All Free Pupils (weighted).	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private and Preparatory.		
1	113·6 ± 8·87 (7)	114·4 ± 7·26 (33)	112·9 ± 3·75 (35)	107·4 ± 7·41 (19)	109·8 ± 5·31 (54)	
2	111·9 ± 4·48 (34)	110·0 ± 3·04 (103)	114·0 ± 3·18 (64)	115·9 ± 4·29 (40)	115·1 ± 3·15 (104)	
3	103·7 ± 6·20 (24)	102·7 ± 4·23 (99)	104·6 ± 4·18 (37)	114·2 ± 6·36 (25)	110·5 ± 4·63 (62)	
4	101·7 ± 8·29 (14)	103·8 ± 5·21 (69)	104·5 ± 5·15 (21)	109·4 ± 10·39 (10)	107·1 ± 7·44 (31)	
5 and over	95·0 ± 5·34 (29)	99·2 ± 3·52 (113)	110·3 ± 6·32 (20)	100·0 ± 8·84 (8)	105·3 ± 6·47 (28)	

	I.Q.					
	1	2	3	4	5 and over	
1	132·3 ± 5·35	130·0 ± 4·92	125·9 ± 3·18	124·4 ± 6·33	125·1 ± 4·53	
2	124·7 ± 3·84	123·6 ± 2·58	126·2 ± 2·46	125·9 ± 3·13	126·0 ± 2·31	
3	119·9 ± 5·43	119·0 ± 3·64	118·6 ± 3·36	127·6 ± 4·08	124·0 ± 3·03	
4	120·5 ± 7·97	120·3 ± 4·86	121·5 ± 4·56	120·2 ± 7·32	120·8 ± 5·30	
5 and over	112·4 ± 4·29	116·1 ± 2·85	124·1 ± 5·34	115·3 ± 7·15	119·8 ± 5·26	

In each case there is a striking difference between the two school groups. In the combined category of smaller business owners and shopkeepers (Table XI), there appears to be a definite association between fertility and intelligence. This cannot be traced for the fee-paying groups. Similarly, among the offspring of those in skilled occupations (Table XII), a significant or regular trend exists for free pupils, but not at all for fee-payers. Because of the small size of the probable errors, the correlation in the group of skilled workers appears the most significant yet found.

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TABLE XII
MEAN FAMILY SIZE I.B. AND I.Q. IN SKILLED OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
(Free Pupils and Fee-payers)

I.B.					
Family Size.	Free Pupils.		Fee-paying Pupils.		
	Elementary, 9·0-11·0.	All Free Pupils (weighted).	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private and Preparatory.	All Fee-payers (weighted).
1	112·7 ± 3·89 (53)	111·2 ± 2·68 (251)	117·1 ± 3·96 (45)	103·5 ± 7·45 (20)	110·0 ± 5·36 (65)
2	107·6 ± 2·83 (103)	108·3 ± 2·08 (524)	119·8 ± 2·92 (63)	105·8 ± 7·91 (12)	115·5 ± 5·61 (75)
3	101·9 ± 2·31 (105)	103·0 ± 1·93 (456)	112·4 ± 4·73 (36)	98·7 ± 3·99 (7)	108·1 ± 3·13 (43)
4	99·5 ± 3·16 (76)	99·7 ± 2·46 (275)	112·5 ± 6·32 (11)	118·0 ± 1·01 (1)	113·4 ± 1·90 (12)
5 and over	90·1 ± 2·13 (166)	91·3 ± 1·56 (532)	101·3 ± 8·51 (15)	104·7 ± 17·96 (3)	102·3 ± 12·84 (18)

I.Q.					
Family Size.	Free Pupils.		Fee-paying Pupils.		
	Elementary, 9·0-11·0.	All Free Pupils (weighted).	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private and Preparatory.	All Fee-payers (weighted).
1	124·8 ± 3·28	124·7 ± 2·28	131·2 ± 3·10	120·4 ± 6·78	125·6 ± 4·84
2	121·7 ± 2·50	123·3 ± 1·72	130·3 ± 2·24	121·5 ± 5·72	127·7 ± 4·06
3	114·9 ± 1·96	117·0 ± 1·54	125·4 ± 3·45	113·3 ± 3·11	121·6 ± 2·41
4	114·1 ± 2·50	115·5 ± 1·89	126·1 ± 5·79	130·0 ± 1·00	126·8 ± 1·74
5 and over	108·5 ± 1·69	110·4 ± 1·18	120·1 ± 6·47	139·5 ± 13·80	124·9 ± 9·85

The unskilled category, analysed in Table XIII for free pupils only, shows no regular trend in the first four family sizes, but there appears to be a marked lowering of intelligence for those families which include five or more children.

The fertility-intelligence correlation for those of the free

TABLE XIII
MEAN FAMILY SIZE I.B. AND I.Q. IN UNSKILLED OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
(Free Pupils only)

Family Size.	I.B.		I.Q.	
	Elementary, 9·0-11·0.	All Free Pupils (weighted).	Elementary, 9·0-11·0.	All Free Pupils (weighted).
1	89·8 ± 5·42 (25)	93·2 ± 3·91 (105)	111·4 ± 4·39	113·2 ± 3·10
2	99·0 ± 2·94 (62)	100·2 ± 5·56 (220)	112·4 ± 2·45	115·0 ± 1·82
3	97·3 ± 3·08 (62)	97·7 ± 5·72 (223)	112·8 ± 2·57	113·9 ± 1·88
4	101·4 ± 3·58 (48)	101·9 ± 2·70 (156)	116·4 ± 2·86	117·5 ± 2·16
5 and over	89·5 ± 2·06 (185)	88·3 ± 1·49 (463)	108·9 ± 1·70	107·9 ± 1·18

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pupils who are selected either for low or high intelligence (namely, elementary schoolchildren aged 11.1-12.6, central and secondary free pupils) has not been discussed here, since the fact that these groups were selected for intelligence would make the results of doubtful value.

The analysis of the tables may be summarized as follows:

Category.	Free Pupils.	Fee-payers.
1. Business Owners and Higher Executives	—	No trend
2. Professional Occupations	—	No trend
3. Minor Professional and other Highly-skilled Occupations	—	Slight trend in first four sibships
4. Clerical and Commercial	—	No trend
5. Professional and Commercial (combined)	Some trend from sibships of 2 to 5 plus	—
6. Small business owners and Shopkeepers (combined)	Slight regular trend	No trend
7. Skilled Wage-earners	Significant trend	No trend
8. Unskilled Wage-earners	No consistent trend	—

In Table XIV, the same connexion between family size and I.B. for socio-economic categories is measured by means of the Pearson correlation ratio. Values have been calculated for those children in schools in which little selection for intelligence takes place.

TABLE XIV
FAMILY SIZE AND I.B. CORRELATION FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS

Occupation.	Elementary, 9.0-11.0.	Secondary Fee-payers.	Private.	Preparatory.
Business Owners and Higher Executives	—	— .04 ± .067 (224)	— .06 ± .068 (212)	+ .02 ± .061 (270)
Professional Occupations	—	— .08 ± .065 (231)	— .08 ± .100 (99)	— .02 ± .060 (283)
Minor Professional and other Highly-skilled Occupations	— .08 ± .141 (50)	— .13 ± .062 (255)	— .07 ± .087 (121)	— .08 ± .075 (178)
Clerical and Commercial Employees	— .24 ± .079 (141)	+ .05 ± .053 (361)	— .14 ± .101 (94)	+ .04 ± .115 (75)
Shopkeepers	— .18 ± .103 (89)	— .08 ± .075 (176)	— .18 ± .121 (64)	—
Skilled Wage-earners	— .27 ± .030 (502)	— .19 ± .074 (169)	—	—
Unskilled Wage-earners	— .14 ± .050 (381)	—	—	—
All	— .23 ± .025 (1,386)	— .07 ± .025 (1,622)	— .09 ± .037 (716)	— .02 ± .032 (963)

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The figures in this table support the inference we have drawn from Tables VI to XIII, namely, that the observed correlation is slight for children of the unskilled, but is significant for those of the skilled wage-earners (-0.14 ± 0.050 and -0.27 ± 0.030 respectively). The children of the clerical and commercial employees are the only other group showing a possibly significant relationship, but since the standard deviation is much larger here than for the group of skilled workers, the value of the figure is reduced. The two correlations are together chiefly responsible for the connexion which we have found in the whole group of elementary school-children aged 9.0-11.0, i.e. -0.23 ± 0.025 .

How are these conclusions to be interpreted? We have seen that when a random sample of the population is divided up into fairly homogeneous socio-economic groupings, the negative correlation between fertility and intelligence applies only within a limited range, namely, among individuals in the category of skilled and clerical workers. Neither the children of the more prosperous sections of the community, nor of the poorest, appear to suffer any marked handicap in intelligence when their parents manifest greater fertility.

We must conclude, therefore, either that the social conditions associated with these latter groups in some way inhibit the appearance of the fertility-intelligence correlation, which would otherwise manifest itself universally, or that the correlation phenomenon is conditioned purely environmentally, and appears only when suitable social and economic conditions exist, such as are associated, for example, with the group of skilled workers and perhaps commercial employees. Since it is most unlikely that the widely varying environmental circumstances found among different social classes would produce the same effects, we can hardly accept the first explanation. The second therefore appears the more probable.

In the absence of further investigation we can only speculate on the nature of those environmental conditions peculiar

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to the class of skilled artisans and commercial employees which produce the observed connexion between intelligence and fertility. It is unlikely that a simple economic explanation will fit the facts, since we are aware of no particular *economic* influence that is relevant only to the group of skilled artisans and commercial workers and is inoperative equally among the unskilled workers and the more prosperous classes. It may be, however, that within the group in question there is a comparatively greater handicap to promotion for individuals with many children, thus leading the more intelligent to limit their families. It is also possible that the more intelligent parent who wishes to give his children the benefit of a higher education will find it necessary for financial reasons to limit the number of children to whom he can give this advantage.¹ Considerations such as these are obviously not peculiar to the category of skilled and commercial workers alone, but it is conceivable that conditions within this group might give greater weight to the operation of such factors than in the remaining classes of the population.

In addition, we cannot rule out the possible importance of differences in accessibility to contraceptive knowledge between the various social classes. When we compare the family sizes of the two groups of skilled and unskilled workers, we find in our sample that whereas the mean sibship of the former is 3.99, that of the latter is 4.61—a difference of 16 per cent. It might be legitimate to infer from this that the more intelligent skilled worker still finds it easier to restrict his family than the more intelligent worker in the unskilled group. Accessibility to contraceptives in the case of the prosperous classes, however, is almost universal, and with the existence of extensive family limitation, there would appear to be no incentive for intelligent parents to restrict their families beyond the usual extent. If this explanation is valid, we may expect the existing negative correlation for the

¹ The arguments in these two paragraphs accept the existence of an intelligence correlation ratio between parents and children. It is not necessary to discuss here the causes of this connexion.

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skilled and commercial workers to disappear with more general access to contraceptive knowledge.¹

Whatever the explanation may be, the existence of a limited fecundity-intelligence correlation in one social category alone must not be allowed to obscure the fact that among the majority no such relationship is to be found. Within the community considered as a whole, the negative correlation that has been observed by a number of workers is to be attributed primarily to the combination of differential fertility and a lower average scoring on intelligence tests by children of the poorer and more fecund classes.

There are two facts that enable us to view this correlation with somewhat greater equanimity than has been shown by such sociologists as R. B. Catell (11), who assert that there is an ineradicable tendency for our population to be recruited increasingly from the "sub-men" of the community. In the first place, it is now a recognized fact that the extent of differential fertility between social classes has narrowed considerably in the last few years, and judging by the evidence of such countries as Sweden, there is reason to believe that it will in the near future cease to exist to any appreciable extent. In that case, even if the poorer social classes continue to give a relatively lower intelligence test rating, the mean scores for the community as a whole will not be affected. Secondly, differential fertility is a far from recent phenomenon. If we assume that differential intelligence scoring also has existed over a considerable period of time, we would expect social investigators to have been able to measure the declining mean intelligence referred to by Catell and others. There is, however, a conspicuous lack of experimental evidence to support their contention. We may suggest that the reason for this is indicated in

¹ Thurston and Jenkins (10) remark, "The negative fecundity-intelligence correlation is probably a recent development, conditioned by the later marriage of the educated classes, and the acquaintance with and use of contraceptive methods among them. With a population among whom these factors are probably as yet little operative, one might expect no negative correlation between fecundity and intelligence. With the ultimate spread of contraceptive knowledge among the less educated classes, it is probable that the negative fecundity-intelligence correlation will diminish or disappear" (pp. 99-100).

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the brilliant studies of such social investigators as Freeman, Holzinger, and Mitchell (12) in Chicago, who have demonstrated strikingly the modifying effect of varying social environment on intelligence test scores. They were able to establish a significant correlation of $.34 \pm .07$ between such unrelated individuals as foster brothers and sisters who were reared in the same home, and who were therefore subject to similar environmental influences. They also found that foster children placed in a "good" home showed an improvement in I.Q. of 5.3 points as against 0.1 for those in a poorer home. In the light of this, it is probable that even granting the continuance of a degree of differential fertility, the conclusion that this would necessarily result in a diminution of the stock of national intelligence can be challenged on the grounds that an improvement in the environmental circumstances of the poorer section of the population would probably do more to raise the level of national intelligence than the more difficult task of attempting to adjust fertility rates. Evidence that the problem is not as vital as has been suggested in some quarters has also been provided by a previous study in this series (7). It has been shown that any anticipated fall in the contribution of ability hitherto supplied by the wealthier social classes could easily be made good from the vast reserve of highly gifted children of the poorer section of the community for whom the State at present offers no adequate educational provision, and whose qualities are, therefore, unused.

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AN ANTHROPOLOGIST'S VIEW OF MASS-OBSERVATION

By RAYMOND FIRTH

A SHORT time ago I was invited to give "a detached summing-up of Mass-Observation—what it stands for, its methods, and the scientific and sociological value, if any, of its findings."¹ As a social scientist I have naturally been interested in what the authors of Mass-Observation have described as "the first tentative approach to a new set of scientific problems," and appear to regard at times as a new science. As an anthropologist I have been particularly intrigued since this new movement is concerned to investigate in English life many of the problems with which anthropology deals in primitive life, and claims to use to some extent the same technique of study.

In his examination of the societies classed for convenience as primitive, the anthropologist is interested to discover not only the formal structure of the society, but also how this structure actually manifests itself in the lives of individuals; he has to determine what issues are important to the people, the opinions that individuals of different types hold about them, and the way these opinions or verbal acts are related to their other kinds of behaviour. To ascertain these things he relies largely upon first-hand observation, not only of what the people say, and say they do, but also of what he sees them do.

His technique is primarily of an intensive, small-scale kind; it might be termed micro-sociological in character as against the macro-sociological techniques of the statistician, the descriptive economist, the historian, and the professed sociologist. Inevitably, the anthropologist is led to compare his results with the material from Western civilized societies.

¹ This paper is based upon a lecture delivered before the Literary and Philosophical Society, Newcastle-on-Tyne, on January 30, 1939.

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Such comparisons, explicit or implied, have so far been largely ineffective or at least imprecise, partly from the anthropologist's ignorance of the results obtained in the other social sciences, but partly from the deficiency of material on those aspects of civilized life which are not easily measurable by the techniques commonly used. In spite of the great body of material available on the political structure of England, we still have no systematic account from empirical observation of what a large section of the people really think about Kingship and the King; in spite of statistics of Church membership and books about the modern trends of religion, we still have only general impressions about what the mass of ordinary folk who are nominal Christians really believe, and how far they carry their religion into their daily life. For rural England, despite the voluminous studies of the family, we have little precise information as to how far kinship ties between the people of a village affect their economic relationships. From the systematic studies that have been made by anthropologists these questions can be answered for a considerable number of primitive societies, and similar material is also available for some American communities. No such series of studies exists as yet for England, though a beginning has been made by Oeser in Dundee, and much scattered material exists in the earlier social surveys.

Anthropologists have long been aware of this lack of a body of material comparable in empirical depth to their own, and Malinowski, in particular, has insisted on the need for a study which might be called the anthropology of civilization. Anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists have discussed proposals for field-study of a more intensive kind than that hitherto carried out, but without producing results of any magnitude so far. They have perhaps been too conscious of the difficulties involved in the task, and in any case they have each had their own more immediate spheres of work.

Two years ago the founders of Mass-Observation, Mr. Tom Harrisson and Mr. Charles Madge, stepped into the breach.

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In the first place they had the idea of getting the kind of material that the ordinary social sciences had not as yet sufficiently obtained. To put it in their own challenging way: "Scientists should spend more of their time in studying normal and everyday behaviour problems of our own lives, as actually lived in the houses and factories, pubs and chapels and shops in this kind of civilization. Above all, it is the job of the scientist to find out, in this field, what people do want, do get, don't get, and could get to want. . . ." ¹

In the second place, and greatly to their credit, not only did they see the problem but also invented a way of tackling it. Their approach has been twofold: firstly, an extensive survey of material by a network of observers all over the country; and secondly, an intensive survey by a small group of an industrial area termed variously Northtown or Worktown. The "national survey" is carried out by observers drawn from various occupations and social classes, untrained, though tutored to some extent by the central bureau, and essentially making their observations in the course of their ordinary daily lives. The "local survey" is done by a group of fluctuating personnel, mostly with experience in one or other of the social sciences, and devoting their whole time to the research while they are with the group. The leader of this group, Mr. Tom Harrisson, spent two years in the New Hebrides, and has published a vivid account of the life of the natives and their contacts with civilization.² This study provided him with an introduction to the technique of anthropological field-work.

In the third place, the aim of the movement has been to present the results in a form which will be of interest and value, not only to social workers, politicians, field anthropologists, historians, and other specialists, but also to the general public, who, it is said, ordinarily will not, or cannot, obtain the results of scientific research. In pur-

¹ *Britain, by Mass-Observation*, p. 231.

² *Savage Civilization*, Gollancz, 1937.

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suance of this aim in the two years since its inception, Mass-Observation has issued a number of publications,¹ which have attracted a great deal of attention, some of a very critical kind. Accusations have been made against the observers of prying into other people's affairs; of seeking to gratify a morbid curiosity by their studies of bathroom behaviour or mantelpieces; they have been represented as merely telling us what we already know, of running a political ramp, an advertising stunt, or a money-making concern, or of simply trying to gain notoriety by sensational journalism. I doubt if any anthropologist takes this view—or at least holds that it is much more true of Mass-Observation than of any other set of people deeply interested in human behaviour and trying to make others realize that the subject of their study is of importance for an understanding of the workings of society. Their admittedly propagandist methods of presenting their findings can be largely explained by their conviction that results of investigation into contemporary opinions and ways of behaving should be made available and interesting to an inquiring non-specialist public. Whether this conviction is well-founded, and has been carried into effect without distorting the generalizations, is another matter.

In brief, anthropologists agree with Mass-Observation that an important series of problems awaits investigation, and that an empirical technique of an intensive kind is necessary for the collection of data. Moreover, collaboration between anthropology and Mass-Observation has been initiated in several ways. At the invitation of anthropologists, material from Mass-Observation, particularly from the Northtown Survey, has been presented by Mr. Harrisson and others before discussion groups at the London School of Economics and at the Royal Anthropological Institute, short visits have

¹ The principal ones to date are: *Mass-Observation*, Muller, 1937; *May 12th, Mass-Observation Day Survey*, Faber, 1937; *Report of First Year's Work*, Lindsay Drummond, 1938; *Britain, by Mass-Observation*, Penguin series, 1939. These are referred to by abbreviations in the text of this article.

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been paid by anthropologists to the Northtown Survey, and Professor Malinowski has written a long analytical essay in the volume on the *First Year's Work*.

Anthropological criticism of Mass-Observation must be regarded then, not as hostility to the aims of the movement, but as judgement, after trial, of some of its basic claims, methods, and results.

Mass-Observation claims to be concerned with new scientific problems, or in its more expansive moments, to be itself a new science.¹ But scientific research, in the field of the social as well as the natural sciences, has certain standards. It demands a clearly stated plan of inquiry; on specific as well as general issues; precision in the methods employed; and results which are directly related to the data obtained, and do not state other than what the data warrant. Moreover, scientific method demands that credit shall be given for prior work in the same field, which has broken the ground by stating the problems correctly and produced material relevant to them. It is not simply a matter of seeing justice done, but of broadening the basis of the new work, enhancing its value by comparing it with the old, and allowing significant factors to be isolated when change has occurred.

How far does Mass-Observation conform to these criteria? No study, particularly in the social sciences of to-day, can be credited with perfection, but a claim to scientific rank must be judged by the degree to which these standards are attained.

To begin with, Mass-Observation itself is intensely critical of the social sciences for their lack of awareness of vital problems, their detachment and isolation, and their lethargy. "In this country, some good statistical work and some excellent administrative sociological reports on areas have been done. But *nothing on normal behaviour* [my italics], and nothing which has approached the formulation of funda-

¹ The Bulletin issued to observers for August 1937 stated: "Already after nine months we are able to see that the Mass-Observation method is justified in practice. Given time, it will produce of itself a scientific theory as useful to mankind as the atomic theory or the theory of natural selection. . . ." (Cf. *May 12th*, p. 413.)

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mental laws in social relations and human behaviour. . . . The blindness and lack of general sense shown by most scientists is inherent in their whole approach. Anthropologists who have spent years and travelled all over the world to study remote tribes, have contributed literally nothing to the anthropology of ourselves.”¹ The work of Oeser alone is praised as a contribution to social psychology. They return to the charge later, more specifically. “A number of important surveys of special areas, Tyneside, Merseyside, London, have been undertaken by University bodies. These have been based on statistical and census material, and on information *invariably obtained from official sources, never by observation and contact with the great mass of the people concerned*” [my italics].² The only exceptions allowed here are the “Pub Survey” of the London Survey, and the P.E.P. group, which is given appreciation for its surveys of the economic and documentary aspects of institutions. Mass-Observation holds that no other organization except itself is carrying out impartial research into normal and everyday England. “In the field of normal *behaviour* and in the whole of the working class, we ourselves still stand and feel alone. . . . There’s nothing better and no one else has so far tried to do this job at all.”³

These are plain statements, and invite consideration. I am not here concerned to try to find some justification for the seeming blindness of anthropologists, or to deny that at the present time Mass-Observation is a unique organization attempting an important task over a wide field, in the spheres mentioned earlier. But is it correct that no one else has ever tried to study normal behaviour in England before, particularly in the working class? Or that all these great surveys, including a number not cited, such as those of York, West Ham, or Brynmawr, invariably, or even mainly, used information obtained from official sources alone? No serious sociologist can think so.

¹ *Britain*, 13.

² *Ibid.*, 232.

³ *Ibid.*, 225.

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I should like to recall briefly some of the material from a few of these surveys. In the Brynmawr Survey,¹ which took three years, voluntary survey workers from all sections of the community itself took part. The chairman of the group was a miner; the vice-chairman a shop-keeper; the honorary secretaries a postmaster and a steel-worker; the treasurer, appropriately enough, a bank manager. Analysis of the population group returns—obtained as the result of personal investigations by members of the group—was done by a steel-worker, and five unemployed miners gave a great deal of time helping in the survey office. It is not surprising, therefore, that the study of industrial relationships should include an account taken down from the lips of an old Brynmawr miner of the fighting between Ebbw Vale and Brynmawr miners in the olden days. Nor is it remarkable that the study of unemployment should discuss observed variations in individual reactions, and offer generalizations about the sense of financial dependence and sense of waste of energies among the unemployed, owing to causes felt to be almost unknown and not to be controlled by the individuals concerned. In the West Ham Survey² a section deals with “home-work,” that is with the making of shirts, blouses, etc., by women. Here 520 cases were investigated by personal visitation; the official statistics were found to be inadequate. (Of 1,167 cases on the Factory Inspector’s register only 520 could be traced as at work.) The hours of work, the rates at which the work was paid, the times at which the women started and finished in the day, the occupations of their husbands, the occasions when the work was taken in, are described. Discussion took place with the women in their homes, and actual records of many typical cases are given from the note-books of the investigators. Among other items, the reasons given for working are documented. These ranged from the work of the husbands being ill-paid or

¹ *Brynmawr: A Study of a Distressed Area*, 1934, by Hilda Jennings.

² *West Ham*, ed. by E. L. Howarth and Mona Wilson, 1907.

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casual or short-time, to the need to buy clothing and boots for children, and to the wish for dress-money, or for a piano. It must be allowed that these empirical generalizations, backed up by citation of much original documentation, deal with the everyday, normal behaviour of working-class folk, are drawn from personal contact with the people described and not from official statistics, and are entitled to rank in the category of material desired by Mass-Observation.

But let us assume that the strictures of Mass-Observation quoted above are merely hyperbole, to drive home the importance of field record of the minutiae of behaviour, and that the real distinction between the surveys and their own work lies in the records of actual conversations and of other anecdotal material. But is even this correct?

If we turn to the *New Survey of London Life and Labour*, we can find 40 pages of essays on the "Worker's Family from the Inside," in which seven railwaymen, six Bermondsey housewives, a carpenter, a busman, and others have written down the details of how they take their holidays, their incomes and how they spend them, and much other information about their domestic life.¹ Seebohm Rowntree's great study in York² was conducted by house-to-house inquiry of 11,500 families, that is the whole of the working-class population of the city. It includes 35 household budgets giving details of *all purchases* and *all meals eaten* for a period averaging a month, and 200 entries about living conditions of this type: "Out-of-work. Married. 4 rooms. 5 children. Drinks. 'Chucked his work over a row.' Very poor. Have to pawn furniture to keep children. Rent 4s." But apart from this there are not a few illuminating records of conversations such as "If there's anythink extra to buy," a woman told one of my investigators, "me and the children goes without dinner, or mebbe only 'as a cup o' tea and a bit o' bread; but Jim (the husband) ollers takes 'is dinner to work, and I give it 'im as

¹ *New Survey of London Life and Labour*, 1935, vol. ix, pp. 393-431.

² *Poverty, 1901*.

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usual; 'e never knows we go without and I never tells 'im.'¹ Or again, in another case where the woman and children have no meat for breakfast, she explains that her husband "must have a bit of bacon to take with him for his breakfast or else all the others would talk so."²

This type of recorded observation has no particular novelty. Nearly eighty years ago Henry Mayhew described his study of the London street folk as "the first attempt to publish the history of a people, from the lips of the people themselves—giving a literal description of their labour, their earnings, their trials, and their sufferings, in their own 'unvarnished' language." Stating that this is the first commission of inquiry into the state of the people undertaken by a private individual—and the first "blue-book" to be published in twopenny numbers, he goes on to say, like Mass-Observation (but with more justification), that "for the omissions, the author would merely remind the reader of the entire novelty of the task—there being no other similar work in the language by which to guide or check his inquiries."³ The mass of anecdotal material in Mayhew's accounts is so monumental that no conception of it can be given here. But two excerpts alone will show how closely the Mass-Observation of 1860 compares with that of to-day. Take a portion of his description of water-cress selling in Farringdon Market about a month before Christmas. "Just as the church clocks are striking five, a stout saleswoman enters the gates, and instantly a country-looking fellow, in a wagoner's cap and smock-frock, arranges the baskets he has brought up to London. The other ladies are soon at their posts, well wrapped up in warm cloaks, over their thick shawls, and sit with their hands under their aprons, talking to the loungers, whom they call by their names. Now the business commences. . . . The saleswomen's voices are heard above the noise of the mob, sharply answering all ob-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 84.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 332.

³ *London Labour and the London Poor*, 4 vols., 1861.

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jections that may be made to the quality of their goods. 'They're rather spotty, mum,' says an Irishman, as he examines one of the leaves. 'No more spots than a new-born babe, Dennis,' answers the lady tartly, and then turns to a new-comer. . . . At another basket, an old man, with long grey hair streaming over a kind of policeman's cape, is bitterly complaining of the way he has been treated by another saleswoman. 'He bought a lot of her, the other morning, and by daylight they were quite white; for he only made threepence on his best day.' 'Well, Joe,' returns the lady, 'you should come to them as knows you, and allers treats you well.' . . .¹ And here is part of a conversation with a seller of sheep's trotters, to illustrate some aspects of public-house custom. "Mother's the best name I'm called in a public-house, and it ain't a respectable name. 'Here, mother, give us one of your b——trotters,' is often said to me. One customer sometimes says: 'The stuff'll choke me, but that's as good as the Union.' *He ain't a bad man, though. . . .* Women's far worse to please than men. I've known a woman buy a trotter, put her teeth into it, and then say it wasn't good, and return it. It wasn't paid for when she did so, and because I grumbled, I was abused by her, as if I'd been a Turk. The landlord interfered, and he said, said he, 'I'll not have this poor woman insulted; she's here for the convenience of them as requires trotters, and she's a well-conducted woman, and I'll not have her insulted,' he says, says he, lofty and like a gentleman, sir. 'Why, who's insulting the old b——h?' says the woman, says she. 'Why, you are,' says the landlord, says he, 'and you ought to pay her for her trotter, or how is she to live?' 'What the b——h——I do I care how she lives,' says the woman, 'it's nothing to me, and I won't pay her.' 'Then I will,' says the landlord, says he, 'here's sixpence,' and he wouldn't take the change."² . . .²

Here we have two types of the basic material upon which

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 146.

² *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 173.

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Mass-Observation relies for its claims—the observer's first-hand record of the behaviour and talk of people engaged in their ordinary occupations; and the memory record, taken down from the lips of an informant, of typical past situations, from her view, in her ordinary experience. The most that Mass-Observation can rightly argue is, then, that the records it presents are fuller, deal with different time and place situations than those already on record, and are drawn from a wider range of observers and informants. In these respects it has a distinct value. Its material allows comparative generalizations to be formulated, is a useful record of the degree of social change that has taken place since the earlier surveys were carried out, and documents institutions and types of behaviour which have not been so far covered. This last statement applies especially to the fields of extra-family kinship, religion, politics, and public ceremonial occasions such as the Coronation of 1937.

But a point to be considered here is the value of this "raw" documentation in itself. At its worst it is mere journalism; at its best, it reveals the actual working of institutions in the lives of the human beings who maintain them, gives valuable indices to thought and belief in a way which statistical treatment has not yet been able to do, and provides lines of inquiry into many points of social relationships that may otherwise be overlooked. Simple statements such as this about all-in wrestling, "I don't like these uneven fights when there is a difference of a couple of stone in the wrestlers," could, if followed up, lead to an inquiry into the factors involved in the ethics of sporting contests. That about Coronation behaviour, "The crowd... cheered... particularly when a lorry full of people in fancy dress, with labels in ink on white calico 'Stars of the Great Broadway,' 'Come up and see me sometime,'" could be built up into an investigation of the popular attitude to sex allusions, with regard to circumstances of time, place, and social occasion. Following on their collection of material, Mass-

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Observation has already begun to work out empirical generalizations on some such topics, and the results cannot but be of interest to sociology.

But certain cautions have to be borne in mind in the collection and use of such material, and here the published views of the earlier survey workers, and of present-day anthropologists, let alone those contained in any treatise on scientific method, should have given a warning and a guide to Mass-Observation. As scientific data the facts accumulated must be relevant to a particular problem. Mayhew realized this quite clearly eighty years ago. In his *Introduction* he lays down his position thus : " Facts, according to my ideas, are merely the elements of truths, and not the truths themselves; of all matters there are none so utterly useless by themselves as your mere matters of fact. A fact, so long as it remains an isolated fact, is a dull, dead, uninformed thing; no object nor event by itself can possibly give us any knowledge, we must compare it with some other, even to distinguish it; and it is the distinctive quality thus developed that constitutes the essence of a thing. . . . To give the least mental value to facts, therefore, we must generalize them, that is to say, we must contemplate them in connexion with other facts, and so discover their agreements and differences, their antecedents, concomitants, and consequences. It is true we may frame erroneous and defective theories in so doing . . . nevertheless, if theory may occasionally teach us wrongly, facts without theory or generalization cannot possibly teach us at all."¹ Following out this principle, Mayhew saw to it that most of the facts he gave were related to his problems. When he quotes a prostitute's story of her evasions of rent-paying, it is in reference to his separation of a special class of such women, known as "bunters," and their relation to high rents charged by low lodging-house keepers.² When he describes the frequency of the drinking of ballast-heavers, it is in relation to the fact that the contractors for ballasting

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 1-2.

² *Op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 223.

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ships were in those days frequently publicans, who followed a truck system in insisting that a large part of the men's wages should be spent on their liquor.¹ So also with the anecdotal material of Rowntree and the later survey workers. Where the crude details of working-class life are given, and conversations quoted, they are an integral part of the wider set of data, and their relevance is clear. Now it can hardly be denied that while Mass-Observation has presented a great mass of facts on many topics that have not hitherto been empirically studied, much of their material is not well integrated, nor linked up with the problems they have stated to be the particular subject of their investigation. This is true of a very great part of the material in the reports in *May 12th*, where description of Coronation activities is interlarded constantly with remarks on the weather, accounts of people's health, or babies or toilet, or arguments about women cyclists or art. As raw material for other problems such disconnected items might be of use, but since their implications have not been explored, and no generalizations about them emerge, they are so much lumber here. This non-selective attitude means that the authors of the book have not formulated their theoretical position at all clearly; so far from the facts speaking for themselves they speak for the state of mind of those who have published them in this form.

In general, in reading the account of *May 12th* one gets the impression of a great mass of detail on individual reactions, but that the central key to these reactions is missing. The Coronation Day is rightly stated to be an occasion of the highest anthropological interest. But though the economic and recreational aspects of the day are fully stressed and the element of local pride in the festivities brought out, little account is taken of what to an anthropologist are essential phases of the phenomenon—namely the complex ritual involved, the religious and moral concepts associated with kingship, and the political structure which gives the frame-

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 273 *et seq.*

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work for the ceremony. We are told in great detail what people say and do when they celebrate, but it is difficult to obtain from the book any clear idea of *why* they should celebrate at all. Since the whole force of Mass-Observation was concentrated upon this institution, one can only conclude that its full sociological significance has been overlooked in certain important respects.

This loading-up of the presentation with masses of irrelevant crude fact draws attention to another important methodological problem. As Malinowski has clearly stated¹ already, the position of the Mass-Observer in the national survey is confused. He is expected to be both informant, giving the subject-matter for the real scientific analysis, and recorder and interpreter of this subject-matter, working at a comparatively low level of abstraction and generalization. But as Malinowski has insisted, "The objective treatment of subjectively determined data must start at the very outset. It must be embodied in the terms of reference of every specific inquiry." In so far as the authors of Mass-Observation stress their position that "Anyone can be an Observer, no special training is needed,"² it would seem that they visualize the observer as informant, whose reports will be subjected to rigid analysis, in the same way as the anthropologist treats the records of talk in his note-books. But elsewhere observer's reports are described as "pieces of scientific observation," stress is laid upon the need for getting "the completely objective fact," and credit is taken for the fact that in the local surveys the observers will not be visiting anthropologists, but "the natives" themselves.³ The confusion that often results from this is seen in an account of the Armistice Day ceremony, where extracts from "reports showing the tendency to oppose the ceremony or not to take it seriously," are given. Three reports are quoted *in extenso*. In one the observer states that he himself agrees

¹ "A Nation-wide Intelligence Service" in *First Year's Work*, pp. 92 *et seq.*

² *Britain*, p. 10.

³ *Mass-Observation*, pp. 40-44.

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that the ceremony should not be indefinitely carried on; in the second the observer begins the conversation and asks, "Don't you think it ought to be stopped?" and the third quotes a maid's negative answer to his question about wanting to hear the service on the wireless, but does not state what his own view of the service is, or whether he had discussed it with her earlier.¹ Obviously the possibility of selective bias on the part of the observer robs this material of much of its value as representative objective record of real opinion on the part of other persons in his vicinity.

Again, in a survey on the danger of war, 1,100 people were asked, "On what do you base your opinion?" Mass-Observation interprets the material thus: "Answers showed us:

	per cent.
Newspapers	35
Friends	17
Radio	13
"Own opinion"	8
Recent history or travel	8
Books	5
Other factors (instinct, economics, observation, human nature, etc.)	10
Negative	4

Newspapers, therefore, easily lead in importance among the factors that make opinion."² Here two kinds of sociological fact are merged—the informant's *impression* of what rôle newspapers and the other items mentioned play in moulding his opinion; and the real extent to which they do so. Mass-Observation has turned the statistics of the first phenomenon into a positive generalization about the second. Yet for this to be legitimate certain assumptions have to be made, such as, that the people questioned were able to differentiate clearly between the real effect of the factors mentioned; and were not influenced in their replies by some specific recent experience—a family row about politics, a film they had just seen (incidentally the cinema does not appear in the table

¹ *Britain*, pp. 207-8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

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quoted), a fortune-teller's description of them as "strong-minded," or a host of other things. Such assumptions do not seem to be valid. To say that newspapers were *alleged* in a great number of the answers to be the most important contributory factor to forming opinion would be fair. But this is not what Mass-Observation has said. Moreover, although the material is expressed in percentages, no evidence is given as to what weights, if any, are assigned to the different factors in answers of the "mixed" variety. Since the initial question is said to have been, "On what do you base your opinion?" and not "What is the most important element on which you base your opinion?" there may have been a considerable number of answers which mentioned several of the "newspapers, friends, radio" elements. And finally, we are not told whether the categories were suggested to the informants in the first place by Mass-Observation, or arose out of the analysis of the empirical material. With all these deficiencies the value of the percentage expressions is largely destroyed.

I shall return to this question of the value of the statistical material again.

Another point of method may now be examined. Modern anthropology places great stress on the study, not merely of what people say, what they say they think, and say they do, but of what they can be actually observed to do. It is a common-place to the anthropologist that these phenomena, all relevant for his investigation, are by no means coincident, and the degree to which they do not coincide is in itself a matter of interest. Now the observation of actual behaviour, of a non-verbal as well as of a verbal kind, ought to be fundamental to Mass-Observation. And, in fact, the studies of the Lambeth Walk and the Chestnut Tree, of all-in wrestling, of smoking and pub behaviour, and of the Coronation have provided a mass of such material. In particular, the Worktown Survey should be of great value here.

But to a considerable extent Mass-Observation now seems to be relying on the direct question, and even on written

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questionnaires, and generalizing from the answers, in a way which ignores the defects which psychologists and sociologists have constantly noted in these methods. For instance, the directors of Mass-Observation have seen that there is an important problem in connexion with the rôle of "magic" in our own society. They have turned their attention to horoscopes, noting that they occupy considerable space in the newspapers of largest circulation. People in working-class areas in London were asked "whether they read the horoscopes in the papers, and whether they believed in them." The results given are "of the women asked, a third believed in the horoscopes, another third partly believed, and the remaining third did not believe in them; while of the men, only 5 per cent. believed, 15 per cent. partly believed, and 80 per cent. said they did not believe at all, though often they complained that their wives and daughters did."¹ These figures would have been of more significance if we had been told the actual numbers of men and women asked, and whether all of those asked gave answers. But apart from the neglect of these elementary statistical precautions, Mass-Observation has failed to carry out its own task effectively—the study of normal *behaviour*. We are told, "It is no exaggeration to say that holiday travel, city investments, the success of advertisers, rumours of war, can be more powerfully influenced by the paper's astrologer than its leader writer or news editor. . . . There is no need to emphasise the effect which this philosophy must have on those who believe in it."² But no material is given at all to substantiate this. And yet the actual influence of the horoscopes on holiday travel, etc., the effect of this philosophy on daily behaviour, is the most important part of the problem. To know that a lot of people say they believe in astrology is one thing, and not so hard to find out, but to know to what extent this expression of belief is translated into action is another, and far more difficult to ascertain. Mass-Observation jibes at anthropology for

¹ *Britain*, pp. 19, 21.

² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

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having contributed nothing to the study of ourselves. But one of the reasons which has held anthropology back is just this realization of the necessity for getting more than a simple set of answers to a couple of questions in order to be able to state what the nature of a particular belief is, and how effective it really is.

In the publication of results, particularly in *Britain*, which is regarded as their best book to date,¹ Mass-Observation has expressed many generalizations in the form of percentages. Let us examine this statistical material more closely. A good example is given by the analysis of some of the results on the expectation of war in recent months. In a London borough referred to as "Metrop." observers asked people the question, "Will there be a war?" This was put in March 1938, by 12 observers to 125 people; and again on September 12, 1938, though we are not told by how many observers, or to how many people. (In addition there was a national survey at the end of August 1938, which gave results very similar to that in March.) Tabulation by Mass-Observation is as follows:

	Mar.	Aug.	Sept.
	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.
Said there would be no war . . .	42	40	55
Said they expected war . . .	34	35	15
Were vague or did not know or care . . .	24	25	30

The conclusion reached is: "It is clear from these figures that so far from there having been an increase in the number of people who thought war was likely, less people said they thought so than earlier in the year. The most striking indication of this is in the two sets of figures from Metrop., which can be *compared directly with each other* [italics mine], and which show that when the question was asked the second time, in the middle of the most serious crisis thus far, 13 per cent. more people said there would be no war and 20 per cent. less people said there would be a war."² It is admitted here that this is what people say they think, only. But taking

¹ *Bulletin*, Jan. 10, 1939.

² *Britain*, 53.

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the material simply as an expression of opinion, what do the figures mean? Can those from Metrop. be compared directly? In the first place, we are not even told if they are the same people in each case. It is a fair inference that they are not, since we are told that the September answers were obtained by "questioning in working-class streets." Can we accept the view that there has been this percentage change, when it is the opinions of a lot of 125 people in one case that are being compared with those of an unnumbered, unspecified lot in another, the known common factor being only that they belong to the same set of boroughs? We are not even informed whether it was the same set of observers in each case. It is admitted later that for the March questioning "the sample was too small," but it is argued that in spite of this "the distortion due to bias on the part of the observers was pretty well eliminated."¹ This assumes that the twelve observers represent a random sample, for which there is no evidence except the cryptic words "pretty well"! Moreover, there is no evidence to say that in either survey a random sample of the population was questioned. Even the 125 persons of the March survey could be adequate if this were so. But for a random sample of public opinion those not in the streets as well as those who were, those who refused to answer as well as those who did answer, should be included. (When asked, "What do you think about the country's foreign policy?" in March 1938, 35 per cent. of Metrops. did not answer at all. But there is no reference to any persons in this mute category in the figures on the expectation of war, unless they are included as "did not know or care.")

Moreover, we are presented with further generalizations. From the 125 Metrops. an age-group of over forty-five is separated, and its opinions expressed as percentages of each of the "Yes," "No," "Vague" groups. It is pointed out that while 34 per cent. of the total opinions in this March

¹ *Britain*, 55.

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survey said there would be war, 47 per cent. of these affirmatives were from people over forty-five years of age. And while 42 per cent. of the total said there wouldn't be war (anyway yet) 29 per cent. of these negatives were over forty-five. The conclusion is expressed, "Thus we see that older people tended more to say that there is sure to be war now. Many of these, over forty-five, were in the last war."¹

These percentages look well, but how many actual people were concerned. Remembering that there were only 125 altogether, 47 per cent. of 34 per cent.—saying there would be war—is 20 persons. And 29 per cent. of 42 per cent. saying there won't be war ("anyway yet") is 15 persons. So the "tendency" amounts to this, that 5 more persons over forty-five said there would be war than said there wouldn't. But 3 *less* persons said there would be war than the "wouldn't's" and the "vague's" together! What would have happened if ten more persons had been asked? How important is this as an index to the trend of national or even Metrop. thought?

The number of answers to the "national" survey at the end of August 1938, on the same question, was 460. Superficially percentage results closely resemble those of the "Metrop." March Survey. But comparison is rendered difficult by the division of the "national" survey results into four heads instead of three (war likely; war unlikely; 50-50 chance; and negative) and into age-groups of over and under thirty instead of over and under forty-five. Moreover, from the table of percentages it is impossible to find out how many people are actually in each of the age-groups. When we are told, then, "the men under thirty are least negative and also most sceptical about war danger," we have no idea what proportion of the total sample they represent.

The upshot of this impressive statistical analysis is the following, "We may suggest that there is an important conclusion to be drawn from all this: that as the danger of

¹ *Britain*, p. 56.

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war comes nearer, so are people less able to admit it, partly through their own wish-thinking, partly through the increasing scarcity of facts.”¹ But in the light of the analysis given by Mass-Observation of the opinions they collected on the state of public feeling in the crisis, statisticians and sociologists will be moved to reflect on their statement that “perhaps we have adduced enough evidence to show that many of the public decisions and nearly all the news in the recent series of international crises have been based often on inaccurate or inadequate reports of fact, and always on inadequate representation or too adequate misrepresentation of public opinion.”²

Apart from the statistics given by Mass-Observation, many of the actual replies they quote are interesting and suggestive, but they would have done well to bear in mind their own qualifications in other contexts, namely, “It is clear that in arriving at any generalization about public feeling, it is necessary to call a great number of witnesses in order to prevent individual bias from interfering with its accuracy; this must be regarded as one of the main justifications of the Mass-Observation method.”³ And “statistical analysis of the 350 answers to the question ‘What do you think about Czechoslovakia?’ is misleading unless one takes into account the complex mixture of feelings in the minds of those who answered, contrasting with the simple way in which they expressed them.”⁴

One of the main faults in the crisis material is in the use that is made of it. Mass-Observation might have followed several lines; they might have attempted to obtain the general trend of public opinion by taking not 125 or 460 views but several hundred thousand or more by methods which have been adopted with considerable success by American journals in taking straw votes, and which have already been applied in this country, as by the British Institute of Public Opinion. Again, they might have ob-

¹ *Britain*, pp. 56–7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 109.

³ *May 12th*, p. 298.

⁴ *Britain*, p. 74.

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tained a true random sample, even from their very small numbers of instances, by using the methods which are the common property of every statistician. Or again, even though they could not get a random sample, they might have obtained much greater significance from their collection of opinions if they had studied these in relation to the various other situations of the persons concerned. A detailed study of their home conditions, their employment, the number of their children, and the liability of these for military service, their special worries, the position of their relatives, and the like, would have enabled us to obtain a much better idea of the factors determining their views as to the possibility of war. Even though this little group was not representative of the country as a whole, it would have given some idea of the position of one small section. This need for investigation of different facets of the life of the *same* people has long been seen by authors of the earlier social surveys and by social anthropologists.

I have assumed so far that the categories in which Mass-Observation has classified its raw material are valid. But in some cases this assumption can hardly be borne out. Take for instance the analysis of "interest in crises."¹ At the end of August 1938, 460 people were asked if their interest in crises was increasing or decreasing. The results were tabulated under 4 heads (increasing; decreasing; stationary; negative), each being divided into two sex and two age-groups. The result is given thus: "the important point to notice is that the largest group here is that which is feeling a definite decreasing interest in crises." We can pass by here the assumption that the reaction to the word "crisis" in itself is susceptible of exact statistical analysis. But the question is, what type of material is included under each of the four heads? Ten typical opinions in the decreasing interest-group are quoted. Five of these include the following statements:

¹ *Britain*, pp. 26-8.

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- (i) "Decreasing, so much so that I *dislike* listening to the news."
- (ii) "Decreasing interest; it's *too blasted uncomfortable*."
- (iii) 'Decreasing, because the helplessness of the individual *appals* me.'
- (iv) "Makes me sick to open the paper."
- (v) "If people start talking about another war I feel like saying, '*For goodness' sake shut up*.'"

(The italics are mine). Now it is arguable that these opinions, one-half of those quoted, might be classified not as evidence of decreasing but of *increasing* emotional interest; the refusal to examine the facts available or listen to other people's views being due to a heightening of the emotional strain. But the crude form of the question and the crude classification of the answers has overlooked much of the real value of the original material. In failing to analyse what is meant by "interest," Mass-Observation has not taken up its own challenge, to study actual behaviour. It has been content to compress its material into a few vague terms and throw it into a table of percentages which does not even represent the original data accurately.

In this analysis I have dealt primarily with the methods pursued by Mass-Observation, since it is essential to consider these in order to judge of the validity of their results. But a brief reference to some of the results themselves may now be made. The anthropologist at least will agree that much of the raw material obtained on aspects of contemporary life is novel and important. Studies of football pools, proletarian art, dancing, all-in wrestling, a Coronation, have their place in modern sociology. Even where we already have material on the same topic, that produced by Mass-Observation can have its value for comparative generalizations. Thus one may expect that the data produced by the Worktown Survey on the "Pub" will give in great fullness an account of an institution which can be compared with

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those given by Seebohm Rowntree in York and the New London Survey. The authors have perhaps exaggerated the novelty of some aspects of their work here. Their inference that for the first time they have taken an actual census of a public-house population is not supported by reference to Seebohm Rowntree's York material.¹ But comparison shows that the Worktown Survey is better insofar as its observers took their count inside the pub. On the other hand, they have not recorded (so far) the proportion of people who went in in company, the length of time people stayed, and a separate count of men and of women, as Rowntree did. But the Worktown generalizations as to the peak of the weekly cycle, and of the daily cycle; and that the last hour in the day is of more than economic significance owing to the importance of "social drinking," are useful. Scattered through their publications are other significant empirical generalizations of the same order.

But in the formulation of generalizations of a more abstract order, Mass-Observation is apt to display a naïve approach to social phenomena. An example might be taken from what is apparently Mass-Observation's basic theory of social structure. This is the division of the social area of an observer into three concentric circles. These comprise: (i) the people in his immediate environment; (ii) strangers, people known to a second person, unusual tradespeople, etc.; (iii) people, and institutions, in less direct and personal contact, including officials, celebrities, ancestors, newspapers, "and such abstract collections as the *People*."² "Mass-Observation is studying the shifting relations between the individual and these three areas, thus seeking to give a more

¹ *First Year's Work*, p. 26; and *Poverty*, pp. 314-26. For the latter a detailed study was made of three public houses in different types of district, each being watched on three days. A record was taken of the number of people entering during each hour, of those who stayed more than 15 minutes and of those who entered singly, in couples, or in groups of three or more. In addition to tables on the peak hours of drinking and on daily variations, comments from the investigators' note-books are given to illuminate the figures. Cf. *New Survey of London Life and Labour*, 1935, vol. ix, pp. 243-69.

² *May 12th*, pp. 14, 348, *et seq.*

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concrete meaning to the abstract word 'Society,'"¹ and again " Mass-Observation has to penetrate into every cranny of social life. The guiding principle is that of the three social areas. . . . Their work (that of the Observers) is going to be the basis of a scientific theory of the areas, which we hope will light up the whole nature of our society."² Sixty pages of material from the "normal-day survey" are reproduced with notes, putting items into areas (i), (ii), (iii), with certain subdivisions. The aim appears to be to obtain a classification of all the everyday activities of a given observer and so to define the varying range of his social horizon. After this classification the authors state, "in concluding this section, it is fitting to point out that any explanations or hypotheses put forward in the course of analysis are the first tentative approach to a new set of scientific problems."³ It is difficult to discuss the value of this approach since the generalizations based upon it so far are somewhat sparse. When, for instance, a young man attends a dance with a young woman to whom he is attracted and feels uneasy when she is appropriated by other men to whom she seems to be well known, the penetrating analysis offered is "she seemed to be in area i for other men, and he wanted her to be in his area i." Again, when a man saw another in a car whom he thought he knew, and waved to him but afterwards realized he didn't know him although the other waved back, he was amused. This is classified by Mass-Observation as "confusion of areas i and ii." I leave psychologists and sociologists to contemplate the vistas of new scientific problems opened up by this. To an anthropologist accustomed to the analysis of behaviour in terms of relationships on the basis of kinship, economics, residence, political organization, and other institutional alignments, this method of concentric circle classification is too subtle.

A comment may be made in passing on one aspect of the

¹ *A Thousand Mass-Observers*, (leaflet), 1937.

² *Mass-Observation Bulletin*, August 1937.

³ *May 12th*, p. 413.

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presentation of the results of Mass-Observation, that is, the acute self-consciousness displayed. Like any other new branch of study it must adopt some propagandist methods.¹ The *Report of the First Year's Work*, comprising 121 pages, includes a 38-page essay by Professor Malinowski, and 16 pages of analysis of press and other criticism, leaving only 67 pages (including title page, etc.) for the results of the work itself. Mass-Observation is very critical of scientists, and of their failure to make the results of their work available to ordinary people. Yet few social scientists have filled nearly half a book for which other people have to pay with someone else's analysis of their work, and their own analysis of what other people have said about them. However, it is fair to treat this as simply an incident in the presentation of the main results, since sensitiveness to criticism is not confined to Mass-Observation alone.

The results of this examination of the work of Mass-Observation may be put in the form of answers to three questions which are commonly being asked. Is Mass-Observation ultimately aiming at something worth-while to social science? It is my conviction that it is; that there are contemporary institutions and aspects of behaviour which need to be studied by intensive field methods to provide adequate documentation. Is Mass-Observation doing the task it has laid down for itself? Only in part. It is recording behaviour about certain types of activity that have not yet been well studied, and is awakening interest in their importance as subjects of scientific analysis. But it claims far too much. It has not clearly formulated many of its field problems, its statistics on the trends of public opinion are shoddy, its samples are inadequate, its questions are often badly framed, and it is content too often to rest on the bare

¹ Compare the blurb on the back of *First Year's Work*. "Mass-Observation is by now well known as the 'nation-wide intelligence system'—as Professor Malinowski calls it"—with Malinowski's own words "A nation-wide intelligence service, if it be really intelligent, and made to cover community and subject-matter alike, would become a real service to the nation. Mass-Observation . . . bids fair, in my opinion, to grow into such an intelligence service" (p. 83).

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answers alone instead of following them up by the much harder work of actual observation. Its comparisons are also weak, if only because it does not always take care to study the same people in different aspects of their lives. And while it continues to stress (sometimes wrongly) the deficiencies in the earlier surveys, it has not apparently learnt from them the careful methods essential to scientific work. It is only fair to say that some of these criticisms will probably not be applicable to the results of the Worktown Survey when they are published. Can Mass-Observation go on to do the job properly, after correction of past defects? It is more difficult to answer this question. So much depends on the scientific temper of the leaders of the movement. On the one hand they have shown themselves eager for collaboration with sociology, anthropology, and psychology, keen to enlist helpers, quick to note comment on their work, and ready to acknowledge its tentative quality. On the other hand, they have tended in practice to demand that criticism should be implemented by direct assistance, instead of attempting to equip themselves more fully for the admittedly difficult task of the systematic collection, classification, and interpretation of their material. It seems to be significant here that the really fundamental criticism made by Malinowski of the dual position of their observers (in the *First Year's Work*) should have found no reflection in the presentation of the material in their book on *Britain* nine months afterwards—except perhaps a reference to anthropologists in juxtaposition with a statement about the lack of general sense shown by most scientists.

If Mass-Observation had concentrated its attention on the analysis of a single institution, it is likely that its results would have been of more value to sociology. An early bulletin states, "Our model must be the patient work of scientists like Darwin, who for over twenty years was collecting the facts to confirm his epoch-making theory."¹ One can only wish

¹ *Bulletin*, August 1937.

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that they had followed their model more closely, and thought over the implications of the facts they collected, for a like period. But in their anxiety to impress as wide a circle as possible with the importance of their movement, they have ignored the old maxim that quick returns are often associated with small profits.

I hope I have shown in this article why one anthropologist, at least, who shares with Mass-Observation the view that their problems are important, cannot share with them their faith in the validity of their methods or results so far. But even though the movement may not consider that it requires to set its house in order, and may make no contribution that will revolutionize modern social science, it has still a value in providing a recreative outlet for its thousand or so Observers, and enabling them to learn something about the behaviour of others than themselves.

ENROLMENTS AT GERMAN UNIVERSITIES SINCE 1933¹

DR. CHARLOTTE LUETKENS

THE advent of National Socialism brought about a definite change in educational and cultural policy in Germany. This article deals with one aspect of that change—the considerable decrease in the number of students in all institutions of higher learning. The figures given cover all *Hochschulen*—the universities, the colleges of engineering, mining, and agriculture, the training colleges for teachers, and the Catholic theological seminaries; the word “universities” as used in what follows covers all these, unless the contrary is stated. Figures² are now available from official sources only up to and including the academic year 1936–37. There is no reason to suppose that the downward trend has

TABLE I
ENROLMENT OF STUDENTS IN ALL HOCHSCHULEN IN GERMANY
Winter Term³ 1932/33–1936/37

Winter Term.	German citizens only.						Foreigners.	Per-cent-age.	Total.	Per-cent-age.
	Men.	Per-cent-age.	Women	Per-cent-age.	Both.	Per-cent-age.				
1932–33	97,576	100	18,578	100	116,154	100	6,693	100	122,847	100
1933–34	91,263	93.5	15,501	83.5	106,764	91.9	4,757	71.1	111,521	90.7
1934–35	76,961	80.9	12,132	65.3	89,093	76.7	4,464	66.7	93,557	76.2
1935–36	70,462	73.4	10,976	59.1	81,438	70.1	4,630	69.2	86,068	70.1
1936–37	57,672	59.0	9,410	50.6	67,082	57.8	4,768	71.4	71,850	58.5

¹ The chief statistics given here are quoted with his kind permission from a statement compiled by Dr. E. Y. Hartshorne (Department of Sociology, Harvard University).

² For the academic years 1932–33, 1933–34, and 1934–35 from *DEUTSCHE HOCHSCHULSTATISTIK*, Vols. 10–14; for 1935–36 from *Die Deutschen Hochschulen*, Vol. 1 (Vol. 2 for 1936–37 either has not appeared or is not accessible in the United States or Great Britain); for 1936–37 from *STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH FÜR DAS DEUTSCHE REICH* of 1937.


³ The university year in Germany is divided into two terms, winter and summer. The winter term extends in general between October and March; the enrolment of students is normally somewhat higher in the winter than in the summer term. It should be noted that the enrolment for the winter term 1932–33 preceded the National Socialist accession to power.

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been reversed since then; indeed, the anxiety expressed in Germany over the present and prospective shortage of trained men in various occupations suggests that it continues in a notable degree.

The preceding table shows the changes in student enrolment in recent years.

These figures are shown in graphical form below. It



will be seen that the downward curve was specially accentuated at the beginning of the academic years 1934-35 and 1936-37. In 1934, a decree of the Reich Minister of the

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Interior limited the number of new admissions to universities for the whole of Germany to 15,000.¹ It seems likely that the introduction of compulsory military service caused the sharp drop in the winter term of 1936-37.

I. The decrease in university enrolment had already begun after 1931, the year in which the number of students reached its peak (138,000). It is partly due to *natural* causes. In 1925, the number of Germans 16 and 17 years old amounted to 4.3 per cent. of the total population; males of those ages amounted to 4.4 per cent. of the male population. In 1933, only 2 per cent. (males 2.1 per cent.) of the total population belonged to this age-group. The numbers of persons in the age-groups 18-20 years exclusive had fallen from 2,570,135 in 1925 to 2,117,077 in 1933 (males only from 1,285,401 to 1,064,701); a decrease from 4.1 per cent. of the total population to 3.2 per cent. (males only from 4.3 per cent. to 3.4 per cent. of all males). This marked decrease was due in the main to the fall in the birth-rate during the years of the Great War. These statistics suggest that a drop in the number of persons approaching university age was to be expected.

If, on the other hand, we take the age-groups 20-24 years inclusive as that comprising the persons of university training age, their numbers did not undergo such rapid decline. They were larger in 1933 and by inference up to 1936 than in 1925. (There are no official German statistics for the year beginning January 1, 1936.) According to the last German census in 1933, there were 3,076,928 males aged 20-24 years as compared with 3,064,728 in the census year 1925. In that year this age-group was 10.1 per cent. of the whole male population and at the end of 1933 9.7 per cent. The sharp decrease in the number of male persons of that age-group did not make itself felt before the beginning of 1937, as will be seen from the following figures:

¹ Some universities may not have been included. For details see Hartshorne, *THE GERMAN UNIVERSITIES AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM*, London 1937, p. 79 ff.

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TABLE II
GERMAN MALES AGED 20-24 YEARS INCLUSIVE

	Total.	Percentage of the Male Population.
June 16, 1910 . .	2,481,054	8.7
June 16, 1925 . .	3,064,728	10.1
June 19, 1933 . .	3,076,928	9.7
December 31, 1934 . .	3,073,000	9.5
December 31, 1935 . .	?	?
January 1, 1937 . .	2,661,000	8.1

Natural causes, then, can only partly and in quite recent years account for the great decrease in the university enrolment. That there are other causes for it than the shrinking in the numbers available according to their age is indirectly proved by the fact that while the number of new admissions to the universities for 1934-35 was officially limited to 15,000, the actual new matriculations numbered only 11,774. More than one-fifth of the high-school graduates (*Abiturienten*) who had been granted the privilege of "University-maturity" (*Hochschulreife*)—a special selective test for admission to the university, including personal, physical, political, and "racial" qualifications apart from intellectual achievement¹—preferred other than academic professions. What had been one of the serious problems of German educational policy before 1933—the flooding of the institutions of higher learning—now disappeared, and on February 9, 1935, the prescribing of maximal figures for university entrance was abolished. Yet, as statistics show, the number of entrants decreased still further.

II. More important factors in the decline in numbers of university students may be found in the *economic* field.

Strange as it may seem, the overcrowding of the German universities had increased rather than decreased during the depression that commenced in 1929. German university fees were and are comparatively low; many organizations,

¹ Hartshorne, *ibid.*, p. 79 ff.

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official and private, helped poor students; and while, on the one hand, opportunities for employment decreased, on the other a university degree as a qualification for employment, even in industry, commerce, and banking, became of increasing importance. Thus it came about that those who had very little hope of employment in any sphere, academic or other, often undertook university courses as a last resort. It might be thought that this was not in itself a bad thing: young people were getting an education even if they had little prospect of work. In Germany, however, the results were unhappy: the fault lay partly with the German university system itself.

Sociologically speaking, the German universities fulfil a double function. They combine the completion of the "general education" (*Allgemeine Bildung*) of the young German with his training in a specialized professional school. A German enrolling at one of the universities is prepared for a particular profession. There is no way into most professions except through the university,¹ and the university examinations alone open the way into many of the professions that have standards and status recognized and enforced by the State. For instance, the examination that ends the university law course is at the same time the entrance examination for the Civil Service and for several other professions. During the nineteen-twenties, there were at times many more persons training and trained for the professions than the number of posts available. Taking into account this function of the universities as professional training centres, the concern in Germany about overcrowding of the universities cannot always be considered as merely anti-intellectual and a danger to educational standards; it was based in part on questions of demand and supply and of the "economy" of university as against other preparations for life.

Further, a result of the special prestige traditionally en-

¹ E.g. such as the procedure for being "articled" to a solicitor in England.

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joyed by the intelligentsia (which included in German society the academic circles and the professions) was that an academic training created ambitions and a social attitude in most university graduates, which made it difficult for them to be happy and efficient in work not necessarily requiring academic training. Only a short time ago, an *Akademiker* regarded a business or technical career as socially and intellectually beneath him; an attitude that does not necessarily develop in countries where going to college or university means primarily getting an education not a professional training. Thus in Germany the overcrowding of the universities threatened to create an intellectual and professional "proletariat," which might become a social menace. Here was a deeper reason for the concern about the post-War "rush" for a university education.

After 1933, this trend had been reversed. Unemployment diminished from various causes. Whereas before 1933 students had pressed into the universities in order to obtain at least a useful training and to escape the horrors of idleness and unemployment, they now saw new fields opened to them—occupations that seemed to promise quicker and even larger gains than the long-drawn-out university courses. Jobs in trade and commerce, and above all in the Army and the Party, were opened to them and had a stronger appeal than the slow training for a profession.

In the same period the number of students entering for practical sciences, such as Engineering, fell very strikingly. In the winter term of 1932-33, the total number of students of the Engineering sciences was 14,477 (German citizens only). It dropped to 13,452 in 1933-34, 10,310 in 1934-35, 9,293 in 1935-36, and to 7,649 in 1936-37. The figures for Chemistry were: 3,543 in 1932-33, 3,604 in 1933-34, 3,006 in 1934-35, 2,696 in 1935-36, 2,058 in 1936-37. For every hundred students of the Engineering sciences or students of Chemistry matriculated in the winter term of 1932-33, only 52.9 and 58 respectively followed these courses four years later.

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The number of women students had fallen to 58.6 per cent. of the former level in the Engineering sciences (135 to 79 in total) and to 44.2 per cent. (516 to 228) in Chemistry. Foreign students in the Engineering sciences were 1,445 in 1932-33 against 1,246 in 1936-37, the latter number being 86.2 per cent. of that for 1932-33.

That the downward trend in the Engineering sciences has not come to a standstill is proved by studies recently made by the VEREIN DEUTSCHER INGENIEURE. According to the statistics compiled by them, the number of students in the summer term of 1937 at the Institutes of Technology (*Technische Hochschulen*) amounted to not more than 43.8 per cent. of those enrolled in the summer of 1928.¹

There are interesting details given about the numerical changes in the various fields of the Engineering sciences. But no general explanation seems to offer itself; no doubt changes in the interest of individuals and perhaps also special conditions in some sections of the labour market have had an influence. The general tendency, however, is the same everywhere: a sharp decline in the number of persons undertaking a scientific training. The greatest decrease in new student enrolment is noticeable in electro-technics; there the registration fell to 19.8 per cent. of that in 1928. This is somewhat puzzling, unless one supposes that there had been an exceptionally large surplus of electrical engineers (e.g. wireless engineers) in the preceding years and that a reaction had set in. As compared with the 1928 matriculation, courses in Architecture dropped to 21.9 per cent. in the summer of 1937, Building Engineering to 49 per cent., Mechanical Engineering to 41.7 per cent., Mining Engineering to 49 per cent., while naval and aeroplane construction courses stood as high as 97.5 per cent. It may be assumed that this last tendency is connected with the general economic trend, with rearmament, and with the growing importance

¹ The year 1928 only reached a level of 100,000 students enrolled, that is less than the numbers enrolled in 1933-34, when the downward tendency had already begun. For the development of university attendance in general, cf. Hartshorne, p. 75.

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of aeronautics both for military and civil purposes. Aeronautics is one of the very few minor subjects in university courses that show a definite absolute and relative increase in the number of students on the register. There were 177 male students (Germans only) in 1932-33 and 250 in 1936-37, a rise to 140.2 per cent. Foreign students of Aeronautics rose from 49 to 52 in the same period.

The number of students of Engineering has, by now, fallen so low that deep concern is constantly voiced from various quarters. The *VEREIN DEUTSCHER INGENIEURE*, whose statistics have been quoted above, expresses the serious concern of the engineering profession, of science, and of industry at the flight of German youth from the colleges that provide training in Engineering. According to the present numbers matriculated, in the years 1938-40 no more than 1,000 young engineers will graduate from the Institutes of Technology, as compared with an average number of 2,700 in the years 1929-35, and already a shortage of trained engineers is noticeable.

The numerical decrease is greater in the Institutes of Technology than in the universities. While the percentage of university students fell to 52.2 per cent. of the 1928 number, the students in the *Technische Hochschulen* decreased to 43.8 per cent. of the 1928 figure. It seems possible, therefore, that young men with a leaning to a practical type of work were more easily attracted by the increasing opportunities offered them in business, in the Army, and in the National Socialist Party, while young men and women of the more bookish, less active types still preferred a university education and career. However, some of the figures of the decreases in the various university subjects taken separately do not bear out this tentative explanation.

In the field of Science the figures for students of Mathematics and the Natural sciences are given in Table III.

Thus, in the winter term 1936-37 the number of men students had fallen to 37.7 per cent. of that for 1932-33, the

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TABLE III
STUDENTS OF MATHEMATICS AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES
(German citizens only)

Winter Term.	Men.	Women.	Both.
1932-33	10,370	2,581	12,951
1933-34	8,883	1,969	10,952
1934-35	6,600	1,343	7,943
1935-36	5,440	1,053	6,493
1936-37	3,908	708	4,616

number of women to 27.4 per cent., and that of both to 35.6 per cent.

At the same time, Agricultural sciences, which had increased in favour as a result of the new *Weltanschauung* of the Reich, showed numbers (German citizens only) increased to 109 per cent. of the 1932-33 figures (men 108.9 per cent., women 111.5 per cent.). The figures in themselves are small, but of interest. The total was 1,356 in 1932-33, and 1,477 in 1936-37, of which 29 were women.

The largest proportional gain in numbers was made by the *Medical* sciences (including Dentistry, Veterinary science and Pharmacy). Here too, however, a considerable absolute fall occurred, as is shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV
STUDENTS OF THE MEDICAL SCIENCES
(German citizens only)

Winter Term.	Men.	Women.	Foreigners.
1932-33	26,012	6,425	1,977
1933-34	27,194	6,288	1,249
1934-35	24,657	5,466	1,196
1935-36	23,294	5,089	1,172
1936-37	18,622	4,175	1,090

Thus, in the winter term 1936-37 the number of German men students had fallen to 71.6 per cent. of that for 1932-33, the number of German women students to 65 per cent., that of both to 70.2 per cent., and the number of foreign

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students had fallen to 55.2 per cent. of the number for 1932-33.

Not only did the medical sciences lose relatively less than all other major subjects, as will be shown later on, but the distribution of studies within the student body has definitely shifted in favour of medicine. In the winter term of 1932-33, 27.9 per cent. of all students were taking medical courses—in 1936-37, 33.9 per cent. were doing so.

Probably the explanation lies in the improved economic opportunities for physicians, following the wholesale exclusion of Jews and "non-Aryans" from the training and practice of medicine. It was estimated that "between 1932 and 1935 roughly 3,500 physicians were admitted to practice, yet the total number of physicians increased only by 125."¹ There appears still to be room for many doctors; further, the medical demand of the new Army and the stress laid on physical fitness, sports, etc., are probably also responsible for the great interest shown in medical courses.

There is a further point that may explain the strength of the medical courses as compared with the striking decline in numbers in the field of the Natural and Engineering sciences. No details and figures are available; but it seems fairly certain that some of the big industrial concerns, especially in the chemical and electrical industry, are trying to train their own research workers, apart from the present State-controlled *Hochschulen*, or in only a loose connexion with them. While such training may be possible to a certain extent in a restricted and highly specialized technical field, no similar substitutes can be found for the traditional medical training given by universities.

In addition to the strong appeal of larger and quicker gains in non-academic and non-intellectual fields, there are other economic reasons for the decline in university attendance. Though the fees and normal expenses of a German

¹ Walter M. Kotschnig, *UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE LEARNED PROFESSIONS*, Oxford University Press, 1937.

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student are comparatively low, academic training involves a considerable investment of capital in time and money, which few students and parents can afford and fewer still seem willing to undertake. The considerations that weigh against such an investment have been much strengthened since 1933. A young German leaving school at the age of 18 or 19 has to serve for 2½ years in the Labour Service and in the Army before he can begin his university studies. If he wants to become a doctor or a teacher, he must give, say, eight years to these and to the succeeding initiation into his profession before he will be in a position to earn his living. If he goes in for a law course, he will probably have reached 32 before he has completed the prescribed theoretical and practical training in the university, in the courts, or in administration, and then only is he ready to begin to practise as a lawyer or to become a junior judge. The gap in intellectual training made by the 2½ years of Labour and Military Service not only delays the age for studying and graduation, but also probably deters many a young man, who has gained "university-maturity," from taking up a long academic career at a time when other young men of his age are already earning a salary. As the German people have never quite lost the memory of the post-War inflation of their currency, the urge to save and to invest for a remote period is weak; and the reluctance to pay for a university education will therefore arise from both economic and psychological motives.

The decline of the studies requiring exceptionally long training (excepting medical studies) is shown by the figures for the subjects classed as Humanities and for some special subjects within that field.

Thus in the winter term of 1936-37 the number of students of the Humanities had fallen to 36.8 per cent. of the number in 1932-33; the number of students of Ancient Languages had fallen to 25.1 per cent.; that of students of Modern Languages to 23.4 per cent. of that in 1932-33.

Law and the Social sciences are included together in the

ENROLMENTS AT GERMAN UNIVERSITIES

TABLE V
STUDENTS OF THE HUMANITIES
(German citizens only)

Winter Term.	Humanities.	Ancient Languages.	Modern Languages.
1932-33	14,078	1,225	3,589
1936-37	5,188	307	842

official university statistics; the numbers include the students in *Handelshochschulen* (Schools of Business Administration) and students training for teachers' posts in commercial training schools (*Handelslehramtsstudium*). The official statistics are given in Table VI.

TABLE VI
STUDENTS OF LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Winter Term.	German citizens only.	Foreigners.
1932-33	24,161	1,070
1933-34	20,363	669
1934-35	15,291	621
1935-36	12,617	651
1936-37	9,680	702

Thus the number of German students had fallen to 40.1 per cent. of that in 1932-33, the number of foreign students to 65.6 per cent. of that in 1932-33.

The statistics provided by the VEREIN DEUTSCHER INGENIEURE give a somewhat more detailed picture. It appears that the enrolment in the Law courses (the fundamental training for the higher posts in the German Civil Service) decreased in the summer term of 1937 to 35.2 per cent. of the registration in the summer of 1928; the enrolment in Economics and Social science (*Wirtschaftswissenschaften*) in 1937 showed less decline, the numbers being only 64.8 per cent. of those in 1928. As the division of the separate "Faculties" is not the same in the various German universities, these last figures can only give a rough idea of what has actually taken place.

There is a rise in the number of students in Journalism, but

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the absolute numbers are small (208 to 358 in total from 1932-33 to 1936-37); this in spite both of the increase in newspaper and propaganda output under National Socialism and of the economic opportunities opened up by "racial" legislation. An explanation may be that there is a current opinion that modern industrialism and technics have little use for people after the age of 40 or 45, and that it is therefore advisable to start one's career as early as possible, especially such a strenuous one as that of a journalist, without wasting time on an academic preparation.

Furthermore, it seems fair to suppose that the general atmosphere of present-day Germany is deeply tinged with dynamic ideas and feelings, and that a predominant and even somewhat hectic tendency towards activity and expansion, a fear of becoming stale and "contemplative," will prevent many young people from embarking upon a career that would provide slower and more stable results and gains.

Among other subjects, Protestant Theology and Ancient Languages have lost numbers heavily. While in 1933 1,225 students read Classics, only 307 did so four years later; a percentage of but 25.1 of the number of 1932-33. Protestant Theology enrolled 6,588 German students in the winter term of 1932-33 against no more than 2,583 in 1936-37, a decrease to 39.2 per cent. of the earlier figure. Catholic Theology, on the contrary, rose to 113.5 per cent. during the same period (4,208 and 4,775 students respectively). In 1932-33 only 3.6 of every hundred students read Catholic Theology; after four years their share in the student body had risen to 7.1 in every hundred.

Pedagogical studies showed large gains in absolute and relative figures.

Thus the number of German men students had risen to 160.6 per cent. of that in 1932-33, that of women to 102 per cent., that of both to 142.3 per cent. of the former figure.

Educational studies were the only major field¹ where the

¹ Not counting the rise in the Agricultural sciences from a total of 26 to 29 students.

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TABLE VII
STUDENTS TAKING PEDAGOGICAL STUDIES
(German citizens only)

Winter Term.	Men.	Women.
1932-33	4,042	1,789
1933-34	2,861	1,249
1934-35	3,958	1,027
1935-36	5,309	1,220
1936-37	6,492	1,825

number of women has actually slightly risen and is relatively almost stationary. The effect of National Socialist policy on the university enrolment of women, limiting the number of women student entrants to 10 per cent. of the total number of students in each university, has been the decrease of women students to 50.6 per cent. of their 1932-33 matriculation.


The rise of Pedagogical studies compared with the decline in other fields is perhaps explained by the need for leaders in various youth organizations and by the greater stress recently laid upon purely pedagogical training of high-school teachers besides a training in their academic subjects proper. It is possible—but this is not clear from the official statistics—that suppression of certain teachers' training colleges (*Lehrerakademien*), and the admission of elementary-school teachers to university courses, had something to do with the somewhat exceptional numerical development in Pedagogical studies. On the other hand, the fall in the number of foreign students in education in German universities is very marked: while in 1932-33 there were 38 men and 49 women from other countries taking courses in Pedagogics, their numbers were 8 and 3 respectively in 1936-37, a drop to 21.0 and 6.1 per cent. respectively of those at the former date.¹

III. Strong as was the influence of military, party, and business prospects in preventing young Germans from

¹ The total number of foreign students registered were: 5,840 men, 853 women in 1932-33, 4,195 and 562 in 1933-34, 3,975 and 489 in 1934-35, 4,137 and 493 in 1935-36, 4,320 and 448 in 1936-37. Thus the number of men in the winter term 1936-37 had fallen to 74 per cent. of that in the winter term 1932-33, that of women to 52.5 per cent., and that for both men and women had fallen to 71.4 per cent. in the same period.

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embarking on a university education, it seems probable that psychological and sociological incentives were equally powerful. They can be dealt with only shortly here; some have been already alluded to in connexion with the rise in



the age of university entrance, which is brought about by politico-military obligations.

In accordance with the social and ideological framework set up and propagated by National Socialism, a decisive shift of social prestige has occurred within German society. The place of women has been redefined, causing a decrease of the interest in, and opportunities of, an academic education for them. The numbers of women students fell more than those

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of men, from a total of 18,578 in 1932-33 to 9,410 (= 50.6 per cent. of the former figure) in 1936-37.

Apart from this, the prestige granted by German society to intellectual achievements has suffered a general decline in a nation mainly bent on "racial," i.e. collective, welfare. Intellectual interests tend to be regarded as a negative force, because isolating the individual from the community and aiming at individual perfection more than at the self-obliterating life within the racial *Volksgemeinschaft*. On the other hand, the traditional prestige of the military sphere has been considerably enhanced.

Combined with the economic boom and the preference for the military mind and profession, this new opposition to the "intellect" has created a sharp decline of the prestige traditionally granted to academic professions. Many of the intellectual professions never belonged to the best paid ones in Germany: but they were chosen and cherished because of the exceptional social prestige and general respect they enjoyed within German society. This social prestige was considered as a fair recompense for low income. To a great extent the basis of this social prestige was the interest taken in the academic professions by the State, as the foundation and keeper of the national ideology. Now, for the first time since the rise of a modern German intelligentsia and the beginning of the political activity of the bourgeoisie, the prestige imparted to the academic life by the State has definitely lessened. At the same time, other careers entice German youth by the offer of better and quicker opportunities. This is specially so in the cases of military and Party careers, with their high prestige and endorsement of the national ideology.

All these sociological reasons are certainly very strong incentives and make themselves felt in university life. They will, no doubt, deter enterprising modern Germans from embarking upon academic careers, since these are both long drawn out and costly, while their prospects are diminishing and their social prestige is definitely on the decline.

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND THE STUDY OF POLITICS

By T. MALING

THE study of political institutions and of political ethics is sometimes assumed to be the study of "political science." These studies may in fact be a part of a "political science," but by definition they can be no more than a part. For the study of political institutions, even a comparative study, affords, for example, no explanation of how they came into being, or what ends they serve and as to whether there are general laws that govern men's behaviour in society. To answer these questions the inquirer must turn to history, but history will certainly give him no clue to all the underlying forces which are manifested in our everyday political and social life, unless history is treated as the raw material for further study. "Political ethics" does not even attempt to answer these questions, nor again by definition should it. It is in fact often an attempt whether explicitly stated as in the *Utopias* or implicitly assumed as in some other works to define the ideal. This implicit assumption exists in the works of J. J. Rousseau; it is to be found in T. H. Green's *Principles of Political Obligation*, and in B. Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State*, and in the whole doctrine of "natural rights." Certainly, in some of these cases political ethics is an attempt to define the ideal in terms of the actual, in fact to evaluate existing political and social institutions. But evaluation without explanation, without a political science, is not sufficient. The absence of such a science may also even make the material on which ethics attempts to base its evaluations worthless. That material is, of course, derived from a study of history and of present-day social and political phenomena.

The raw material, then, of a complete political science exists, as most political thinkers from Aristotle to Marx and to modern exponents of Fascism have recognized, in history.

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But while this has often been stated and more often implied, history has, with a few notable exceptions, rarely been approached as the raw material of a political science, except by unscientific exponents of a political doctrine. This is undoubtedly partly because historians are generally too absorbed in building up their picture of the past to give time to a consideration of the present, in the form of science. In fact, if we accept merely for purposes of argument R. G. Collingwood's view as expressed in the *Philosophy of History*¹ that history is a special form of knowledge distinct from science, we are criticizing the historian for not being both a historian and a scientist. Unfortunately, this argument can be interpreted as implying that historical knowledge cannot be used by the scientist for his own ends. This we hold is a misinterpretation of this view of history; for R. G. Collingwood himself says: "This conception can be expressed by saying that all knowledge is historical knowledge (individual judgement) and that science is history, with its individual reference neglected." Science also frequently makes use of historical knowledge to arrive at its general laws. Biology, for example, has used historical knowledge which it has itself obtained to enable it to check its conclusions about the present by reference to the geological past. At least we can say then that the political scientist must also be a historian, and that is but a little way from criticizing the historian for not being a scientist.

We are equally boldly criticizing the sociologists who, unlike their fellows, the economists, have often enough abandoned the search for general laws in very many fields and fallen back on the collection of data. Even with the economists, the gap between those doing theoretical work and those engaged in the collection and compiling of material is widening daily. Thus we are given detailed descriptive studies of institutions and constitutions, social conditions and the like

¹ *The Philosophy of History*, by R. G. Collingwood, published for the Historical Association by G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1930.

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comparable to historical studies of the same kind. Comparative study has, of course, yielded alike to the historian, to the economist, and to the sociologist fruitful results, but few general laws have emerged from it. Moreover, many sociologists deprecate any approach to the problems involved with the object of testing theoretical conceptions. Yet science has surely always progressed as a result of the testing of general theories by observation and as a result of the illumination of observation and of classification by the formulation of general theories.

In sociology and history it has been left in fact largely to the exponents of a particular political creed, to political pamphleteers, and to others who wish to satisfy the public taste, to concern themselves with these general theories in manifestoes, pronouncements, and in historical biographies and autobiographies, or even in historical dramas. Thus Marx and his followers have attempted to account for historical development. Their doctrines have found their way almost unconsciously into the thinking of the more academic historians. Consequently, the validity of their findings has not been tested by those historians who have in fact extensively borrowed from them. Similarly, Mazzini's doctrines of nationalism have coloured historical thinking since his day. Historical biographies at least implicitly claim that personality is a factor in influencing the course of history, but it is almost impossible to discover any scientific assessment of how far an individual due to his own personality has influenced historical events. Admittedly the study of present-day institutions has not in some ways suffered so badly. For the information collected and the facts described have often been gathered with an immediate objective in view or by a declared Marxist Liberal or Fascist. But here again little attempt is made except by the Marxist or the Fascist to explain the phenomena described or to assess the importance of personal and emotional factors in the institution.

Dr. Finer, a liberal writer, assumes the existence of

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emotional forces in his account of Fascism,¹ but hardly examines their origins, explains them or examines their relation to economic forces. Therefore, he cannot be said to have examined Fascism in a scientific manner, perhaps because, in fact, he does not possess the tools with which to do it.

H. J. Laski treats Communism² in the same way. He says, for example:

"The compelling strength of Communism is that it has a faith as vigorous, as fanatic, and compelling as any in the history of religions. It offers dogmas to those whom scepticism troubles; it brings to its believers the certitude which all great religions have conferred; above all, perhaps, it implants in its adherents the belief in their ultimate redemption. If it is said that, like other religions, it destroys and persecutes, it can make the answer—which mankind has always found a convincing answer—that it destroys and persecutes in the name of truth. It is fatal to underestimate the strength of this temper. It is the thing that moved the early Christians, the Puritans of the seventeenth century, the legions of Mahomet, to victory, against obstacles which must have seemed insuperable to their contemporaries. To those who do not accept it, it may seem a joyless creed which takes from life its colour, and a relentless creed which takes from the hearts of men the sovereign virtues of charity and justice. But to such an attitude there are at least two answers. The Puritan creed did not seem joyless to those who embraced it; on the contrary, there was for its devotees a splendour in its stern renunciation more emotionally complete than any other experience it was possible to know; and when the mind, secondly, becomes possessed of a truth it believed to be exclusive, it no longer admits that charity and justice are sovereign virtues." Here, in fact, is an implicit admission that emotional factors at least play a great part in determining the course of history, an admission moreover

¹ *Mussolini's Italy*, Herman Finer.

² *Communism*, H. J. Laski.

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by one who is prepared to accept in great measure the Marxist view of history. But the conceptions employed in the description are vague and unexplained. Communism is described by comparing it to great religions of the past, particularly to the Puritan religion. But then we are told that that religion and therefore Communism provide a "stern renunciation more emotionally complete than any other experience it is possible to know." But we are not told why it is more emotionally complete or what craving within the individual is satisfied by this "stern renunciation." Is not this because we lack, or do not employ, a real political science concerned with the emotions of men in society and with the emotions of individuals? For unless we accept the crude behaviourist argument, it is apparent that emotional forces are generated within the individual and not the immediate result of mere external stimuli. If this is the case, it is then in the emotional life of the individual as well as in the economic life of the community that we must seek a basis for a political science. Thus in the relation between environment and emotional life we may find, like A. J. Toynbee in his *Study of History*, some explanation of the rise and decay of civilizations. But we would look closer than he does at the life of the individual in the hope that that will throw light on the creation of a real political science.

Psycho-analytical research has as yet little influenced the study of history and while lip service is paid to it by sociologists and political thinkers, little effective work has been done by these persons to incorporate its discoveries in their work. This has been partly due to attempts to create a "social psychology," originating in modern times in the crude doctrines of the Utilitarians, which has not been and is not based on the close observations of individuals, their feelings and impulses, but on generalizations which are held to explain the actions of individuals in society. The anthropologists have on the other hand obviously been more beholden to modern psychological work. Yet the psycho-

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analysts themselves have not been unaware of the importance of their work alike to historians, to sociologists, and to political thinkers as Professor Freud has shown in his *Group Psychology* and the *Analysis of the Ego*, Dr. Ernest Jones in *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis*, and Dr. Edward Glover in *War Sadism and Pacifism*, and in the *Dangers of Being Human*. While the psycho-analysts have, in fact, turned their attention to historical and sociological problems, it is difficult for workers in these fields to obtain an insight into psycho-analytical theory since so much of the material is scattered in collected papers, in journals, and in works written for practising psycho-therapists and doctors. Here, in fact, the responsibility for the lack of enlightenment of the sociologist and the historian rests rather on the psycho-analysts than on workers in these fields. This, of course, has been almost inevitable in a rapidly developing science which is mainly concerned with therapy. Nevertheless, without the assistance of psycho-analysis it seems that neither the sociologist nor the historian can understand the events or the institutions he wishes to describe. It may be said also that without some knowledge of physics or chemistry this is equally true, but the historian and the sociologist are primarily concerned with men and their personalities and with the creations of man and not with the material world. Psycho-analysis is par excellence the science concerned with individuals and therefore the concern of the sociologist and the historian, but above all of the political scientist.

The use of psycho-analysis by the historian and the sociologist might uncover many of the causes of our "Modern Discontents." It certainly would afford us an opportunity of assessing, for example, the importance of economic factors in determining the course of history, if only by contrast with the other factors involved. Moreover, it would probably assist the psycho-analysts themselves in their own work.

The material which needs interpretation is either immediately ready to hand, or can be collected with comparative

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ease. It is impossible here to enumerate all of it that needs examination or that could be examined. But some of the problems raised by the amassing of material by other workers can be mentioned and the lines along which it might be examined. Thus constitutional lawyers have spent themselves on explaining the intricacies of the constitution of the British Commonwealth of Nations and on the determination of where sovereignty lies. We know the means by which ministers are made responsible to Parliaments elected by the people, but hold office from the King. But we do not know what emotional needs are satisfied by elaborate fictions which, while depriving the titular head of the State of power maintain many of the forms and ceremonies of an ancient monarchy, and while protecting the King from attack, permit his ministers to be abused as freely as the Press and the public desire. We do not know whether the preservation of this anachronism is vital for the preservation of free institutions or whether in fact from an emotional point of view it will endanger it. This it might be suggested is because we do not know what emotional reactions are set up by these fictions in the lives of the individuals who make up the community. But there is already in existence a body of psycho-analytical theory which purports to explain very similar phenomena, namely a person's emotional relation to his father or to father figures such as schoolmasters, employers, and the like. Strikingly enough it shows how frequent is the individual's attempt to associate all the good paternal qualities with one object and all the bad paternal qualities with another. It therefore only seems reasonable to examine the phenomenon of constitutional monarchy or, for that matter, constitutions such as the French in the light of this theory.

Possibly the two most significant features of European history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the emergence of religious toleration within the nation state and the growing national consciousness which culminated in the patriotic uprisings against Napoleon. But was not this in

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fact an exchange of "intolerances" obscured only by the attack on the Napoleonic despotism and by the adoption of liberal slogans by the national heroes of the period? Therefore, is it not reasonable to inquire whether "intolerance" of those of a different religious creed and of those of a different nationality does not serve the same purpose in the emotional life of any body of persons? Again psycho-analytical theory purports to explain similar phenomena in the lives of individuals. It finds, for example, that there is a tendency for individuals to associate all aggressive and hate feelings with one object, possibly in this case the nation or the church, and all love feelings with another, possibly the hated foreigner or the heretic. This is, of course, as in other cases, an attempt to solve the difficulty of both loving and hating the same object at the same time by attaching all love feeling to one person, thing, or ideal, and all hate feelings to another person, thing, or ideal.

The significance of persecutions would afford an interesting field for study whether in modern Europe or in Marian or Elizabethan England. It would be interesting to compare the environments in which they tended to emerge. It might be asked whether they did not occur when, for some reason or another, a sense of guilt due to the infringement of a strict but possibly outworn moral code was to be noticed, and whether this did not generate a violent desire to blot out the very guilt itself by some cruel or aggressive act. This same national guilt feeling may be awakened possibly by some real or imagined defeat or humiliation and lead to the same results. In both cases a victim of persecution may well serve the dual purpose of affording an outlet for aggressive and hate impulses, and be also a kind of sacrificial atonement.

It is, of course, impossible to attempt to do more than suggest broad lines of inquiry and it is very improbable indeed that any historical phenomenon can be accounted for in terms of one individual emotional situation. But it is possible that work of this kind might throw interesting light on the

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persecutions mentioned, on the destruction of the Albigensians, the ferocious cruelty of the Thirty Years' War, and on the judicial murders and "blood baths" generally associated with violent revolution. It is at any rate almost impossible to over-emphasize the need for an understanding of these outbursts of passion and persecution which make men fearful of change or force them to extremes. Certainly no political science of the moment affords an adequate explanation.

Psycho-analytical studies might well help to explain many of the features of our modern world, such as the power of advertisers, particularly of patent-medicine advertisers, spending as they do £3,000,000 annually on advertisements in the National Press alone. Is this due to a widespread fear of death, or to fear of constipation, sexual impotence, or repulsiveness? Probably to a fear of all of them. How far then, for example, one may well ask is the fear of constipation based on a genuine anxiety or how far does it spring from a lingering memory of childish admonitions and instructions which were accompanied by moral pressure, and which may at an early period of life have appeared severe and thus caused its memory to persist? Another feature which might well repay investigation is the multiplication of religious sects and their equally rapid decay once they have exhausted their pristine enthusiasm and modified their tenets to meet the demands of the "world." Social studies such as that being conducted at Bolton may very well provide extensive material for such investigations.

Perhaps some adventurers and some of the modern dictators have stumbled almost accidentally on a discovery of how to manipulate some of the forces we have discussed. Other persons, from Alexander to the Crusaders, have doubtless done the same. This, of course, raises the further problem on which psycho-analytical studies might throw some light, namely the assessment of the importance of particular historical personalities. It might help to explain the actions and fortunes of some historical characters. Paucity of

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material might cramp such inquiries. But letters and autobiographies provide some evidence, and it has at least once been successfully attempted by Dr. Ernest Jones in his study of Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland.¹

The aim of some of these inquiries could be tentatively defined as discovering how far normal, social, and political life is governed by irrational emotional forces. These may be due to the fact that a whole people is unaware that it is allowing itself to be dominated by impulses which if it perceived them clearly it would not approve, or to the fact that its judgement of ordinary events and of other peoples is warped by its psychological state. Thus it may be dominated by what it adjudges to be a high moral purpose which may in reality be merely an aggressive impulse, or it may be so obsessed with the idea of its own humiliation that it misinterprets almost every action on the part of any other peoples as an aggression against itself. These judgements of course lead on to action, so that what we want to know is how often does the community lose its temper, as we say, without justification, how often does it sulk and how often go into a blind rage, or, more correctly, how often does each individual in the community do it in such a way that it lends colour to the assertion that the community is doing it. Above all, we must discover what are the underlying causes which release these moods in individuals and in the community? It would be necessary to determine whether they are similar in different historical situations. Superficially it seems probable that they often are.

A technique for making these inquiries will of course have to be evolved, but this should not present insuperable difficulties. The broad principles of psycho-analytical discoveries can be grasped if attention is paid to the literature of the subject. It remains for the historian, the sociologist, or the psycho-analyst himself to examine the historical or socio-logical material he may have amassed in the light of these

¹ Dr. Ernest Jones, *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis*.

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principles, and after he has drawn his conclusions to see whether parallel examples to the mass emotional disturbances which he will doubtless find in society can be discovered in the case histories of individual patients. If this is so, he will have grounds for interpreting the emotional forces at work in society along the lines employed to interpret those that have been found in individuals.

In this way a historian who is acquainted with the psychoanalytical literature about guilt will examine the Elizabethan persecutions in this light. Doubtless he will find a society pulsating with the excitement of shaking off the shackles of the mediæval papacy and passionate to taste the intoxicating new learning, but nevertheless reluctant to abandon entirely the tenets of the old religion and the old morality, and trying to create a new allegiance and to impose it on all and sundry with the moral weight of the old loyalty. Here, in fact, he will find a struggle and a conflict. Uncertainty leads to anxiety, which leads to aggressiveness and to cruelty, to violent attacks against the representatives of the old and the new, to sacrifices first to one dictate of conscience and then to another. Might not a parallel to this state of mind in the community be found in the experiences and difficulties of adolescence or of the child when it is attempting to free itself from the morality and preconceptions it has taken over from its parents, and to adjust this morality and these preconceptions to its own discoveries in an ever-widening experience of the world? Would not the conflicts of the *Œdipus* complex throw light on this situation showing how ambivalent is the attitude of the individual towards what may be either a mother or father figure, the Church? Is it not possible that a close examination by a historian of these events might not clear up some of these points after he had made a preliminary survey? He could but attempt it. If some of his assumptions proved to be correct, he might look for analogous cases in the history of other persecutions, and then attempt to determine what

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released these conflicts in a given situation and how far a knowledge that they would be released might have modified their force.

It is probable that in this kind of inquiry into the emotional forces at work in the community, it may be possible to obtain a much clearer understanding of political events. In this way the study of "politics" will cease to be so formal, and it will be possible to use historical knowledge scientifically. The gap which we found between the study of political institutions and the study of political ethics may be bridged. Both these studies will remain necessary. For a discovery of the forces which determine the forms of political institutions will not enable us to dispense with accounts of political institutions, nor an understanding of their legal and constitutional significance. Nor will such discoveries enable us to evaluate political institutions and political actions without consideration of the ends which they serve. To do this we must turn to "political ethics." Again, while these studies would make use of historical knowledge and would be used by historians, their object would be the discovery of general laws and, therefore, if we accept tentatively R. G. Collingwood's dualism, they would be a part of scientific work and not a part of historical work. We should thus have a political science which would give us a greater understanding of our own society than we now possess. It should be possible to enunciate general laws about the manner in which men and women behave in society and about the behaviour of those societies themselves. This would of course immensely facilitate the practical aspects of social and political reconstruction. Studies, then, of the sort we have outlined open up a wide field for exploration.

BOOK REVIEWS

HUMAN NEEDS AND MODERN SOCIETY. By B. T. Reynolds and R. C. Coulson. London: *Cape*, 1938. Pp. 284. 10s. 6d.

Neither of the authors of this book would call himself an intellectual, neither would admit to being learned; but they have written something that breathes the wisdom of those who know. Not without the help of books, but chiefly from the school of experience they have drawn their counsels: experience, a source of which one might well say that those who use it can lay claim to infallibility. Not that one accepts everything in these pages as the truth; but that the conclusions arrived at are unanswerable.

Society, said Plato, is the soul "writ large." Whether one accepts this analogy or not, the observations that accompany it on the sources of weakness and strength—meaning fitness—in both soul and society are as true to-day as they were in ancient Athens. Harmony, unity, good-will beget strength; discord, schism, mistrust are the seeds of weakness and ruin. The root of this latter condition the Greeks called *stasis*. As I see it, precisely this condition of things forced itself on the authors of this book, as too prevalent in post-war England. Disturbed by the rifts they found between man and man, and between group and group, and by the unreadiness—or is it inability?—of the one to appreciate the other, they set themselves to seek a remedy.

Convinced that all institutions, the home, the school, the church, the municipality, the State, are meant to serve the highest needs of the individuals belonging to them—better said, constituting them—Reynolds and Coulson found many of these institutions stranded far from the goal they were in search of; and too many suffering souls and bodies left by the wayside as a result. Experimentation with working men in different parts of London convinced them that one vital thing was lacking all along the way. There was too little human intercourse, notably of the intimate sort. They tested this out, and got startling results. Not an easy thing to do, but a sure way of salvation; no tinkering or patching here, but "a new man," and with it a new social order. They call it "progress by Charity"—a great word, but fallen on evil days. *Caritas*, however, has nothing to do with the giving of doles to hungry tramps, or even the collecting of funds for a City Mission. It is a quality of the soul, meant to become a dynamic operating in the social order: the which, as was said long ago of something else, "if it had might, as it has right, it would rule the world." How vastly different, let us say "happier," the world of 1938-9 would be for us all, if this desire of Bishop Butler could be realized!

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Human Needs falls naturally into three parts. Personally, I find the third the most interesting, and it would do no harm to begin with it. The first contains a psychological analysis of man, and his calling. The second surveys the social changes that have begotten the special needs of our time. In the third we have the writers' own story, telling us how they discovered these needs, and what ways they chose to meet them. Put in a single word, the Discussion Group was the key: and it proved a powerful instrument, capable of unlocking the most stubborn doors. Rarely did it fail of its purpose; as a rule changed attitudes, and so changed lives resulted. But not every such Group could achieve this. Sound science, wise pedagogy, and much of the milk of human kindness were among the ingredients; above all, an atmosphere of complete equality and of absolute sincerity. For the technique the reader should go to the book itself. He will not be disappointed.

W. J. ROSE.

A HISTORY OF MILITARISM. By Alfred Vagts. *G. Allen & Unwin Ltd.*, 1938. Pp. 510. 18s.

Militarism certainly is one of the most powerful forces determining the fate of the world. When allied with Nationalism and thus rooted in the traditions and ideals of great nations it even is the strongest of all factors—much stronger than all the other creeds struggling for power in our world. Yet very few people have a clear idea what it really means. Sociologists and historians have up to now given little attention to the task of an exact description of militarism and its rôle in history, though they have used the word incidentally. Now at last a fully qualified historian, Alfred Vagts, has given us a History of Militarism, for which not only scholars but everybody interested in politics must be grateful. The work is based on an astounding knowledge of military and political history and on practical experiences of war too—as the author served for four and a half years in the German army during the last war. He was afterwards a lecturer at German universities till the outbreak of Hitlerism made him an exile. In spite of the great scholarship embodied in this book it makes interesting and often exciting reading for the general public too. Every thinking observer of politics will find in it valuable material and conclusions for forming more correct estimates of the forces underlying the course of politics.

The author first of all tries to define what he means by "Militarism." He makes a fundamental distinction between "military" and "militaristic," and in this he is certainly right. The superficial habit of calling everything connected with military aims or means "militarism" is most unfortunate and totally misleading. The right point of view is

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to designate as militarism a certain attitude towards politics and social life subordinating everything to ways of thinking and valuing typical for professional soldiers—though not every soldier is a militarist nor every civilian free from militarism. Such ways of thinking may be absolutely right on the battlefield, on drill grounds, or in barracks. As soon, however, as they are transferred to politics, economics, social relations, or cultural conditions they may become terribly dangerous—just as if you would give to a successful stockbroker or a famous scholar the position of a general commanding thousands of men in battle.

As a matter of fact, every profession is apt to develop a specific mentality which is useful within its own limits and pernicious beyond these limits. Business men naturally think that the whole State should be run like a business concern, that the best ruler be one from their ranks, and that their interests are more important than those of any other class. Agrarians, workers, artisans, professors, are taking exactly the same view of their own professions, ideas, and interests. We often hear nowadays women reproaching men for having mismanaged politics completely and asserting that there would be no wars and no misery if only women could rule according to their own ways. Nothing, therefore, is more natural than that military men should also share these illusions of every class as to the general validity of their professional rules and the pre-eminence of their principles and interests. The difference is only that in certain countries the military leaders have acquired a much greater power than any other class and that their mentality has developed on lines widely divergent from that of civilians. An illusion which may be harmless if held by a greengrocer may become highly dangerous if held by a field-marshall.

Mr. Alfred Vagts goes to great lengths in describing the peculiar military mentality which easily becomes militaristic when applied to other than military matters. He shows that this mentality is not exactly the same and has not the same power in all countries. British officers may have certain militaristic views in common with French or German officers and occasionally may have striven for greater independence than was compatible with the spirit of the Constitution. But they have not succeeded at all. The extraordinary power of militarism in certain countries and its weakness in others can only be explained by history. Mr. Vagts's book is the most important contribution to this work hitherto achieved. He shows how the social structure of certain States, economic and technological evolutions, the formation of ideologies, have all helped to bring about those peculiar forms of militarism which non-militaristic nations are almost unable to understand.

One of the most surprising facts is that militarism is very often opposed

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to the requirements of military efficiency. Again and again the soldiers have refused to listen to proposals for improving military technique put forward by technological experts. In most cases the reason was that a new invention seemed to jeopardize the personal interests of officers, their chances of promotion, or their traditional standards of honour derived from feudal ideals. The peculiarity of militarism is determined not only by the application of certain technical ideas developed in the military profession to other fields but also by the fact that in most countries the officers were mainly recruited from the ranks of an aristocracy imbued with special traditions and ideals. Their spirit was expressed in certain notions of honour and prestige, which sometimes had considerable influence on politics too.

F. HERTZ.

THE PUBLIC SERVICES: A HISTORICAL SURVEY. By W. Hardy Wickwar. *Cobden-Sanderson.* 10s. 6d. net.

In their note introducing this book to the circle of possible readers the publishers say, "In its broad sweep it makes no attempt to give dull and detailed descriptions of each and every administrative machine. But it does aim at presenting an estimate of present tendencies, against a background of past developments." Certainly the work escapes being dull. Mr. Wickwar has succeeded in imparting sustained interest and often a delightful vivacity to a narrative dealing with events and movements not for the majority of people intrinsically picturesque and attractive. He has, indeed, written a most readable history of the public services.

The book is a companion to the author's earlier volume on the Social Services, and it covers the public services of a less personal character. It reviews the development of the services concerned with roads, railways, waterways, carriage of goods and passengers, postal communications, telegraphs, telephones, wireless, water supply, gas, and electricity; and in each case it relates the organization of the service to the changing environment, technical, economic, political, and social, which has surrounded it. More briefly, but with special interest because of the newness of the field, a chapter headed "Some Auxiliary Services" describes the public-service aspects of overseas trade facilities, financial facilities, food supply, conditioning services (drainage, etc.), conservation of natural resources, and scientific investigation.

The publishers' warning that absence of dullness involves absence of detail need not be taken too literally. The book is the fruit of industrious and discriminating research into the origins of the various services and into the crises and new departures which have occurred in the lives of the older of them, and it contains much interesting and illuminating

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information of a detailed character. The present reviewer, having spent the greater part of a lifetime in one of the public services treated pretty fully in the volume, is able to testify to the accuracy of the facts given in the section dealing with that service and to the soundness of judgment displayed in selecting for comment what is relevant and important. Nevertheless, it remains true that the main value of the book lies in its presenting in a broad way a background of past developments and an estimate of present tendencies.

If the estimate of present tendencies is not executed as confidently and convincingly as the presentation of past developments, one ought not, perhaps, to complain; for tendencies have a disconcerting way of turning round corners, and Mr. Wickwar is wise in not being over-emphatic about the direction in which things are going. Even in the past, as the story which he tells makes clear, there has not been uniformity or close parallelism in the courses pursued by the several services. It is the variety of the types of organization and administration which stands out prominently at the close of the survey.

Mr. Wickwar directs attention to one general line of development. It became evident in the seventeenth century that certain businesses are, as a famous judgment expressed it, peculiarly "affected with a public interest," and the recognition of this led to regulation and to the granting, at a price, of profitable monopolies. Then came the period when *laissez-faire* was the dominating doctrine, and the policy adopted by the State was the encouragement of competition. The policy often broke down, and this phase has passed. Mr. Wickwar ably describes the change to the present condition in which the State aims at co-ordination instead of competition. Such co-ordination takes widening sweeps and assumes a variety of forms; and the reader is presented with an interesting outline of what has so far happened under the influence of the movement.

Beyond presenting this faithful picture of wide and varied development, Mr. Wickwar does not go far. He does not appear fully to appreciate the problems which recent experiments in the setting up of semi-public authorities, like the British Broadcasting Corporation and the London Passenger Transport Board, seek to solve—first, the problem of securing flexibility and continuous advancement when the incentive of seeking profits and the danger of attack by rivals are both withdrawn, and secondly, that of maintaining responsibility to Parliament without the hampering interference of politics and politicians. He speaks slightly of some of the features of these new authorities, but does not attempt a really critical examination of their constitution and scope, or of their performances so far as they have gone.

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Judgment of the successes and failures of these organizations is not, of course, easy. Merely commercial and financial valuations do not serve; and Mr. Wickwar himself provides an interesting illustration of the danger of applying them (in this case to two well-established services). In speaking of the telephone service he says, "It has shown what a nationalized service can do when it is on its mettle, just as the telegraphs have given a display of nationalization at its worst." Nobody would suppose, on seeing this comparison, that the telephones and the telegraphs have been under one and the same management. What makes the invidious comparison possible is the unfavourable position of the telegraph system, judged commercially, arising from the circumstances that it was purchased at an inflated price, had its tariff fixed uneconomically by a resolution of the House of Commons, and was doomed to find its traffic steadily attracted by its younger sister, the telephone system. The question, however, of the efficiency and value of the service, judged socially, passes beyond these considerations. Costing and commercial comparisons should, it goes without saying, be carried as far as possible, but how to measure social worth and ensure intensity in the performance of function, once you get away from commercial criteria, is a difficult problem. It is indeed the outstanding problem of the public services, and it profoundly affects the questions of form of organization and methods of administration. If Mr. Wickwar's book does not take us very far into the nature of the deeper sorts of public-service problem, it brings us, by an interesting road and under capable guidance, to the situation in which the problems stand developed, and greatly helps to an appreciation of the place and importance of the public services in the social structure of the modern world.

A. J. WALDEGRAVE.

PEP (POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PLANNING) : Report on the British Social Services: a survey of the existing public social services in Great Britain with proposals for future development. *Published by PEP, June, 1937. Pp. 210. 7s. 6d.*

Within the lifetime of those of us who are still young, the social services have become a characteristic feature of the social organization of every Western community. It may even be that a careful study would show to how great an extent the dictatorships and the democracies have this one trait and tendency in common, however much they may differ in the constitutional form which they have given to their State. One of these constitutional differences is inevitably the liberty allowed for the full, free, and open study of contemporary policy in all its bearings.

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In Great Britain, for instance, the need for analytical and critical surveys of the nation's social services as a whole is beginning to be met by publications that emanate from outside our State departments and universities. Of these surveys the latest and weightiest is PEP'S *Report on the British Social Services*. Its birth was greeted with a leading article in *The Times*. It has indeed much in common with *The Times*, both in style and in outlook. It is an authoritative work. Even if only because of the windows which it opens up for thought, it is much to be hoped that as many students of social well-being as can afford it will find room for it alongside the well-known handbooks of the National Council of Social Service and of the London Charity Organisation Society. And there might be much to be said for bringing the more stimulating parts of this Report—the summary, Chapters 1 and 9, and above all the illuminating diagrams—within the reach of a wider public and a narrower pocket.

This is not to say that it has escaped the defects that are almost inseparable from any work of many minds. On the contrary, it suffers from them to a high degree. An individual may form a general impression of the nature of British society and of the place which the social services hold or ought to hold within that structure; but the tone in which this report is written suggests that its authors either could not agree on any such general impression, or could not agree that it was desirable or relevant.

This weakness shows itself chiefly in three ways.

The first is the attitude of the Report towards questions of class. In our modern cult of the community or the State, we run the grave risk of relegating class to the place once occupied by sex in the limbo of unmentionables. To use so unfashionable a word is almost enough to brand one as a die-hard or a revolutionary; and PEP is notoriously neither. Yet British society is incomprehensible without regard to its subtle class texture. And the social services are essentially class services. They are attempts to keep a modicum of civilization and security within the reach of those whose capital resources and spending power are not enough to enable them to purchase these good things of life for themselves. One hundred years ago we dreamed that people of all classes might become equally independent and live on their own earnings and savings; to-day we know that the private earnings and voluntary savings of the majority are inadequate, and we have therefore developed the social services. With an eye on their historical evolution, I would venture to define the social services tentatively as attempts to defend and improve the wage-earner's standard of living by other means than the raising of wages. Of all this there is not a hint in this

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Report. It has been bold enough to attempt a definition; and for this it deserves real gratitude; but it is not along these lines, and it is, I think, the less convincing the more one looks into it. We read on page 10:

"For the purposes of this report, however, the term Public Social Services will be restricted to those services, provided or financially assisted by the public authorities, which have as their object the enhancement of the personal welfare of individual citizens. Impersonal environmental services such as public sanitation, street lighting, housing, and town planning will not be considered."

The distinction here made is clearly between personal and impersonal services. Whether the operations of a professional bureaucracy of county-hall officials, relieving officers, investigating clerks, health visitors, and elementary-school teachers are aptly described as personal depends on the extent to which words ought or ought not to be given their obvious and natural meanings. I would submit that the true distinction between social services and public sanitation is that social services are intended only for certain classes, whereas public sanitation is for all classes.

A second serious criticism is of the way the social services are classified. They are grouped under three headings. First come what are here called "constructive community services," because they are nominally open to all who wish to make use of them: these consist mainly of educational, medical, and employment-finding machinery. Next come what are already well known as the social insurances, which confer contractual rights on privileged categories of participants. And lastly we have the "social assistance" that adjusts relief according to the applicants' means and needs. Now, the scientific value of this classification is strictly limited. It is essentially a legal classification. It is doubtful whether it has much historical, social, or psychological validity. Let us take a few instances. Elementary schools, maternity centres, and employment exchanges may legally be open to all comers, but only on a "take it or leave it" basis: no one uses them who has the chance of getting anything better; and nothing is proved, beyond a purely abstract and irrelevant legal point, by re-spinning the old yarn that once upon a time some employment exchange did play some part in filling some £1,500 post. To read that such services are based on common citizenship (page 11), makes one rub one's eyes and wonder whether it is a real world of flesh and blood that is being described or a world of legal fictions. The authors themselves become aware that something odd is happening when they put our comparatively honourable non-contributory old-age pensions in the same bed with our somewhat humiliating unemployment assistance and public assistance; but their qualms are

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purely legal—assistance can be increased at discretion in order to meet needs, whereas old-age pensions are limited; their doubts do not arise from the different mental attitude engendered by the presence or absence of the poor-law taint and the household means test, or from the resulting difference in the class from which recipients may be drawn. They show no signs of being aware that they are doing something even stranger when they pigeon-hole the deficient and defectives among the constructive community services. A community service they may be legally, in so far as the local authority is supposed to attempt the registration of all defectives and deficient who belong to certain pathological categories, and also in so far as pastime occupations are promoted for them; yet the great bulk of official time and public money goes not to these so-called community purposes but to maintaining those whose families have no facilities for looking after them at their own expense. And a constructive service they may be in the case of the small minority that can be rendered employable by training, healing, or the supplementing of inadequate earnings; yet all that can at present be done for the overwhelming majority is to give them some form of domiciliary or institutional assistance. It is not even as though this very arbitrary classification had the virtue of covering all the social services. It makes no room for working-class housing, which has indeed been relegated to two quite different supernumerary categories on pages 10 and 38.

My final criticism would be that the practical usefulness of this survey is far from clear. If it helps accustom us to thinking of the social services as a whole, that will be all to the good. But it claims to be doing more than that. It speaks of a broad strategy of future development, and it claims to be giving "the consensus of informed opinion about the next stage in their development." Yet it disclaims all attempt to think out a long-range plan or programme. Now, informed opinion is apt to mean official opinion. And this scientific attempt objectively to discern tendencies is apt to mean the uncritical acceptance of large-scale experiments, such as the Hadow schools and the public midwifery service, as well as an excessive admiration for the hand-to-mouth expedients adopted by one's own local authority. (L.C.C.—worship: pages 97 and 156). Something more than this is, however, implicit in the very classification of the social services. It is the assumption that social insurance can be extended so as to narrow the range of social assistance. And this assumption is backed up with a comparison with Central European countries, where a greater proportion of the average wage-earner's earnings is taken from him as social insurance contributions—a comparison that is apt to be abstract and misleading when it is torn from its social context, and in particular when it is not correlated with

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the worker's consumption-habits and the cost of his home. Yet the extension of social insurance has not hitherto brought with it much curtailment of the field of mere assistance. Instead, it has led to a reduplication of services. Inadequate insurance benefits need supplementing. So long as they remain inadequate, they cannot give the poorer majority a measure of security that is in any way comparable with the relative security conferred on the richer members of society by the possession of capital. But although it is hinted at, this problem of adequacy is nowhere adequately analysed. And one is left with a feeling of real regret that Political and Economic Planning has been so busy studying the present that it has not yet had time to plan for the future satisfaction of this deep social need.

W. H. WICKWAR.

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PERIODICALS RECEIVED

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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW		Feb.
ASIATIC REVIEW		April
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GEOGRAPHY		March
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INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW		Feb., March, April
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INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF AGRICULTURE		Dec., Jan., Feb.
JOURNAL OF HEREDITY		Dec., Jan., Feb.
JOURNAL OF THE LONDON SOCIETY		April
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY		Vol. CII., No. 1
MAN		Feb., March, April
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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY		March
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VIERTELJAHRSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIAL-UND WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE		Vol. XXXI., 4
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV		March
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